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False Speech: Quagmire? 
CHRISTOPHER P. GUZELIAN* 
Recently decided cases in several Federal Courts of Appeals and the
United States Supreme Court show that First Amendment false speech 
case law is contradictory and unpredictable.  This Article gives examples 
and concludes that legal liability for false speech will continue to be 
arbitrary and even susceptible to intentionally unjust decisionmaking if 
judges and juries individually and collectively disregard or downplay the 
necessity of an honest search for truth under the guise of tolerance and
evenhandedness.  If Americans wish to avoid an anything-goes “quagmire”
about truth, they must—despite inevitable resistance in a civilization 
increasingly rife with skeptics—undergo transformations of their thinking
habits to genuinely seek and successfully identify truth with charitable 
application in law. In addition, a certain kind of optimism is necessary
to render consistent, predictable, and correct conclusions in false speech 
cases. This Article’s implications may also extend beyond false speech to 
other areas of constitutional and common law. 
* © 2014 Christopher P. Guzelian.  Assistant Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson 
School of Law, San Diego, California, guzelian@pobox.com.  I am grateful to Nathan
Chapman, Douglas Groothuis, Marilynn Guzelian, Philip Guzelian, Jr., Marybeth Herald,
Nathan Schachtman, Robert Schmidt, and Steven D. Smith for helpful comments.  Kind 
thanks go to my research assistants Jay Adelino, Alex Mashiri, and Michelle Bartolic.
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Article is based in part on that brief.  I also extend my gratitude to the San Diego Law
Review editorial team led by Nicholas Karkazis and Annie Kinsey, which performed
commendably in preparing this publication.  Opinions and errors remain mine. My wife
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I. INTRODUCTION
“What can I say without getting punished?”
“Will you punish me if I tell this untruth?” 
These are questions that every self-preserving kindergartner weighs
when vexing parents. And they are questions that every American
concerned about the free ability to speak in countless situations must
consider. Yet, just beneath the surface of recent so-called false speech
cases that have worked their way through the courts are unsettled
questions about how American courts in the twenty-first century view 
the relationship between truth and the Constitution.1 
1. A recent series of federal circuit cases and a 2012 Supreme Court case— 
United States v. Alvarez—have touched upon the thorny issue of false speech.  See 132 
S. Ct. 2537, 2542 (2012).  At the center of these cases is a law passed by Congress in 
2005—the so-called Stolen Valor Act, or SVA—which authorized federal criminal
prosecutions of those who had allegedly falsely represented that they had won a military
medal. See id. at 2543. If convicted, the defendant received up to a year in federal 
prison plus a fine. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 704(c) (2006)). 
The courts dealing with these various prosecutions focused largely on two questions: 
(1) whether false speech is generally unprotected under the First Amendment, as opposed 
to a lack of constitutional protection only for select traditional categories of false speech,
namely, fraud, defamation, perjury, and false commercial speech, and (2) depending on
the answer to question number one, whether the SVA is too vaguely written or
overbroad. See id. at 2547. This Article is not intended to address either of these issues.
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These open questions rest upon the bedrock issue of truth telling, 
which is at the core of much jurisprudence.  The stated goal of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence is reaching the truth.2 Judges often concur with this 
mission statement.3  Thus, if we examine false speech law, we might 
gain some insights into the structure of law itself.  And what we end up 
seeing is that Americans are mired in a great quagmire about how to 
handle questions of truth in First Amendment matters.  Even a cursory 
inspection of First Amendment case law reveals widespread, sometimes
inexplicable, inconsistencies in false speech verdicts.  This Article’s first 
four substantive Parts—Parts II through V—nonexhaustively survey
four common categories of such dispute or inconsistency that arise. 
In Part II, I demonstrate one unresolved disagreement among courts:
deciding which question of fact—“proposition”—underlies any particular 
allegation of false speech.
In Part III, I show that there is much dispute—both academically and 
in the courts—over the truth about any particular proposition: whether a 
correct answer exists, whether it can be known, whether we know it, and
how we know it. 
In Part IV, readers will observe that there are disputes about whether 
truth changes. 
Part V reveals that there is vast dispute about how to delimit which 
sanctions are appropriate for a given speech. 
2. FED. R. EVID. 102 (“These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in 
administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth
and development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and 
proceedings justly determined.” (emphasis added)).
3. For instance, one federal judge in Kansas recently wrote,
The precepts of fair trial and judicial objectivity do not require a judge to be
inert.  The trial judge is properly governed by the interest of justice and truth,
and is not compelled to act as if he were merely presiding at a sporting match.
He is not a ‘mere moderator.’ As Justice Frankfurter put it, ‘(f)ederal judges
are not referees at prize-fights but functionaries of justice.’  Johnson v. United 
States, 333 U.S. 46, 54, 68 S. Ct. 391, 395, 92 L.Ed. 468 (1948) (dissenting in 
part). A federal trial judge has inherent authority not only to comment on the
evidence adduced by counsel, but also—in appropriate instances—to call or 
recall and question witnesses.  He may do this when he believes the additional 
testimony will be helpful to the jurors in ascertaining the truth and discharging 
their fact-finding function. 
United States v. Lee, 972 F. Supp. 1330, 1345 n.5 (D. Kan. 1997) (quoting United States
v. Liddy, 509 F.2d 428, 438 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).  Not always, however.  See infra Part 
III.A. 
21
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In the concluding Part VI, I will try to persuade readers that courts are 
having a particularly hard time with false speech cases because many
judges’ preferred mode of rendering false speech verdicts rests either 
explicitly or implicitly upon philosophical skepticism about some facet 
of truth.  Judges—particularly those who proudly and loudly advocate a 
laissez-faire, libertarian First Amendment philosophy—may not even
recognize that their default mode of First Amendment judgment could, 
in fact, be a form of skepticism that can be catastrophic to notions of
truth-seeking. 
Part VI further asserts that there is a growing foundational skepticism 
that, if sustained, could be deadly to false speech jurisprudence: a doubt
whether the Constitution itself is a legal instrument capable of settling 
disputes. If the doubt is collectively accepted that it is not so able, then 
it is possible that all American false speech jurisprudence simply devolves
into power-seeking struggles among various factions to assert their
“perspectives” of “truth” to the legal detriment of others’ perspectives.
Readers may depart with an unsettling—possibly correct—impression 
that these difficulties about truth’s proper role in law extend beyond First 
Amendment false speech cases alone.  Based on legal confusion and judicial 
unscrupulousness or ineptitude, the possibility of political capture of
court proceedings, competing views about truth and its relation to law, and
courts’ widely divergent views about legal arbiters’ proper authority and
role, the repercussions for courts’ credibility and for public order are
significant.4  This Article calls attention to the problem. It concludes
that individual and collective renewal of an optimistic kind of attitude 
could enable a humble search for truth that might offer an exit from the 
legal quagmire. 
II. “ASSOCIATION”: LINKING PROPOSITIONS AND SPEECH 
A first question for a judge in a false speech case is this: which questions
of fact—propositions—are properly associated with allegedly false speech? 
Association is a highly important first step in the determination of false 
speech in legal contexts.  Let us take a hypothetical example.  Say a speaker 
exclaims, 
“Cheese shouldn’t do that!”
4. Supreme Court popularity has recently hit a record low in modern times. 
Pew: American Approval of Supreme Court Hits All-Time Low, CBS LOCAL (Mar. 25,
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An investigation of the speech’s historical setting is required to grasp
the proper association. Assume the speaker at the time of the speech was
in a laboratory full of rats and cheese in cages.  This fact might suggest that
an associated proposition is
(A) “The cheese in the rat cage is causing the white rats to salivate,” 
or 
(B) “The cheese in the rat cage is causing the black rats to salivate.” 
More context is required to determine whether one, both, or neither of 
these propositions is associated with the speech.5  If the evidence shows 
there were no black rats in the laboratory at the time of the speech, it is 
then perhaps less credible for a litigant to claim that proposition B is the 
correct proposition to associate with the litigated speech. 
Despite this evidence, a litigant might still try to contend that proposition 
B is a suitably associable proposition.  For instance, the litigant might 
introduce evidence that the conversation with the speaker shortly before 
her exclamation “Cheese shouldn’t do that!” was about black rats in a
different laboratory and the conversation was not in reference to the
white ones that happened to be in the laboratory at the time.  If this were 
the case, perhaps proposition B could still be an associable proposition, 
although it is now more ambiguous which proposition to legally associate, 
given the white rats close by.6 
It is not correct that only one proposition is ever properly associated
with a particular instance of speech.  The speech “Cheese shouldn’t do 
that!” in the context in which it was said could be associated with a near
5. See SUSAN TIEFENBRUN, DECODING INTERNATIONAL LAW: SEMIOTICS AND THE 
HUMANITIES 32 (2010) (“To arrive at a more certain and uniform interpretation [of a 
given instance of speech], connotational factors should be taken into consideration: the
historical period in which the utterance is made, the special meaning the term might have
had at the time it was first made, the intention of the speaker as evidenced by other
related documents, and the linguistic context of the utterance itself.”).  Context can also
matter intensively in deciding whether a proposition is true.  See infra Part III.A. 
6. There may be some entrepreneurial, dubiously ethical litigation “bias” lurking
in false speech cases.  If there are monetary damages at the end of the rainbow for proving a
“falsity” embedded within a litigated speech, the potential for financial reward incentivizes
lawyers to “see what sticks” by identifying propositions known in advance to be false 
and litigating claimed “associations” between those false propositions and a near limitless
supply of speakers and speeches that can be cherry-picked.  Witness the explosive growth of



















infinite variety of propositions or combinations of propositions.  Some 
of these propositions might strike us as almost comical, yet to another 
evaluator examining the speech’s context—the speaker, the audience, a
focus group, or the presiding jurist in a false speech case—they could 
appear sincerely plausible: 
“The cheese in the rat cage has become moldy after eleven days”— 
proposition about observed physical data. 
“The third rat, while salivating, did a full backflip with a handstand 
because it smelled the noxious vapors the cheese put off”—scientific 
causal proposition.
“The King of the Gods, Zeus, would never permit cheese to be placed 
in the same cage as rats.  That cheese can’t really be in that cage”— 
mixed metaphysical causal proposition and observed physical data 
proposition.
“It is unethical to keep unmonitored cheese in the same cage as 
laboratory rats because it causes them to breed more heartily, thus 
heightening the risk of plague outbreak”—mixed moral and scientific 
causal proposition.
One’s speech, as we see, can generate nearly as many possible
propositions as one’s imaginative scope about reality permits.  It is not
just in the realm of hypotheticals that association difficulties arise.  In
First Amendment litigation, identification of a speech as true or false 
frequently turns on decisions about which proposition is legally proper 
to associate with the speech and whether that proposition, in turn, is true 
or false:
 If a striking union pickets a hospital with signs that say, “This 
hospital is full of rats!,” is the proper proposition (1) “The 
hospital is a contractor that does not pay all of its employees 
prevailing wages or provide health and pension benefits to all 
of its employees” or (2) “The hospital has small furry rodents 
running rampant through it?”7 
 Which proposition does use of the term black propaganda in 
a Filipino ethnic community equate to: “racist propaganda,” 
7. See San Antonio Cmty. Hosp. v. S. Cal. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 137 F.3d 
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“disseminating false information about someone,” or something 
else?8 
 Is the brand name “Havana Club” of a rum distilled in Puerto 
Rico equivalent to the proposition “This rum was produced in 
Cuba”?9 
 If someone is called a “fascist” and “radical right-winger,” 
what definition of those terms should be used to evaluate the 
plaintiff’s claim of defamatory falsity?10 
 Is it a false product portrayal—amounting to the proposition 
“This is exactly what your product will look like and how it 
will function”—if a mock-up of a shaving cream product is 
used in a television ad to portray comparative foaminess over 
other products if it would be otherwise impossible to show the 
actual benefits in the normal time allotted in a television ad?11 
 Does a television ad claiming “Listerine is as effective as 
floss at fighting plaque and gingivitis. Clinical studies prove 
it” amount to the proposition that one need not floss if regularly 
using mouthwash?12 
Association is a practice that directly implicates whether a speech is
true or false for legal purposes.  Say three propositions—A, B, and C, where 
both A and B are true, but C is false—are plausibly associable with a
given speech. The jurist who associates C with that speech and rejects
associations with A or B is labeling the speech false.  But a jurist who
rejects C, accepting either A or B, is decreeing the speech to be true. 
This Article need not belabor the subject of association—roughly equal to
“semiotics”13—here, as much has been written elsewhere about it.14  My
8. See Celle v. Filipino Reporter Enters., 209 F.3d 163, 187–88 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).
9. See Pernod Ricard USA, LLC v. Bacardi U.S.A., Inc., 653 F.3d 241, 248–49 
(3d Cir. 2011).
10. See Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 893 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding that there is
“tremendous imprecision of the meaning and usage of these terms in the realm of
political debate”).
11. See Carter Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 523, 526–28 (5th Cir. 1963). 
12. See McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Pfizer Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 226, 231, 249–50 (S.D.N.Y. 
2005) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
13. See UMBERTO ECO, A THEORY OF SEMIOTICS 7 (1976); CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE,
A Survey of Pragmaticism, in 5 COLLECTED PAPERS OF CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE ¶ 464, 
at 317, ¶ 488, at 335 (Charles Hartshorne & Paul Weiss eds., 1974). 
14. See, e.g., ECO, supra note 13, at 30. 
25









     
 
    
     
 
 







point is rather to say that courts do not give much formal thought to 
association. When they do think about it, their approaches are incredibly
haphazard. Reported cases reveal that courts regularly use at least seven
different and commonly incompatible methods to make legally binding
associations between speeches and propositions, termed methods of 
association: 
(1) experiential association; 
(2) actual false perception; 
(3) similarly situated reasonable audience false perception; 
(4) quantified false perception; 
(5) literal truth; 
(6) subjective intent; and 
(7) legislature or agency definition.
   Case law does little to articulate why and when one of these methods is 
to be favored over another.15  Each is discussed below in turn. 
1. Experiential Association 
Judges sometimes associate propositions with speeches simply without 
reference to any guiding principle or rule.16  Even Supreme Court Justices
are not immune from such practices, such as when having awarded damages
15. There are exceptions, certainly.  Cf. Celle v. Filipino Reporter Enters., 209 F.3d 
163, 177–78 (2d Cir. 2000).  The Second Circuit stated,
[F]ederal courts follow [standards] in determining [the meaning of] a statement 
or publication [alleged to be] defamatory.  [C]ourts “must give the disputed
language a fair reading in the context of the publication as a whole.”
Challenged statements are not to be read in isolation, but must be perused as 
the average reader would against the “whole apparent scope and intent” of the
writing.
Second, courts are not to “‘strain’ to interpret such writings ‘in their mildest 
and most inoffensive sense to hold them nonlibelous.’” 
Finally, “the words are to be construed not with the close precision expected 
from lawyers and judges but as they would be read and understood by the 
public to which they are addressed.” It is the meaning reasonably attributable
to the intended reader that controls.  This determination can be particularly difficult
where the readership in question constitutes a distinct ethnic community of which
the judge is unfamiliar.  In such instances, expert evidence or surveys can be
useful, though none was supplied by the parties here.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Armstrong v. Simon & Schuster, Inc., 649 N.E.2d 825, 
829 (N.Y. 1995); November v. Time Inc., 194 N.E.2d 126, 128 (N.Y. 1963)). 
16. See, e.g., Lambert v. Calprotrack, Inc., No. 95 C 4076, 1996 WL 224515, at 
*3 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 1996) (“Plaintiffs assert, ‘the prominent positioning of these 
individuals in a sales memorandum alongside a discussion of the Hamilton Well certainly
suggests a power to control all aspects of the Hamilton Well, including sales of its 
interests.’  I doubt the value of this argument based on semiotic theory.”).
26
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for emotional distress in asbestos exposure cases.17  In one Connecticut
state court case involving a criminal citation for an obscene gesture, a
minor riding on a school bus displayed his middle finger at a passing 
state trooper.18  The minor challenged the citation on the grounds that his
action was not obscenity under First Amendment precedent.19  The judge
agreed, holding that the youth’s finger display did not have erotic meaning
in context.20  Yet the judge did not identify the method by which he had
put his finger on this interpretation.21 
2. Actual False Perception 
The Supreme Court has stated a clear test of falsity in defamation law: 
a speech that “would have a different effect on the mind of the reader
from that which the pleaded truth would have produced.”22  This same
definition has been invoked in cases involving commercial disparagement,23 
fraud,24 intentional interference with business relationships,25 false
17. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 155–56 (2003) (“Asbestosis [which 
indicates a nine to ten percent lifetime risk of contracting mesothelioma] is ‘a chronic, painful 
and concrete reminder that a plaintiff has been injuriously exposed to a substantial amount of
asbestos, a reminder which may both qualitatively and quantitatively intensify his fear.’”
(quoting Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 481 So. 2d 517, 529 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985))); see
also Sinn v. Burd, 404 A.2d 672, 683 (Pa. 1979) (limiting recovery for emotional distress to
circumstances “where a reasonable person ‘normally constituted, would be unable to
adequately cope with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances’ of the event” (quoting 
Leong v. Takasaki, 520 P.2d 758, 764 (Haw. 1974))). 
18. State v. Anonymous, 377 A.2d 1342, 1343 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977). 
19. See id. 
20. Id. 
21. See id. 
22. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 517 (1991) (quoting 
ROBERT D. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 138 (1980)) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990)
(acknowledging that literally true, but misleading, defamatory statements are not First
Amendment protected speech any more than are literally false and misleading defamatory
statements of fact).  Justice Byron White, sitting by designation on the Eighth Circuit,
explained the validity of this “actual perception” test of falsity in defamation-by-
implication cases in more detailed terms. See Toney v. WCCO Television, Midwest Cable
& Satellite, Inc., 85 F.3d 383, 387 (8th Cir. 1996) (applying Minnesota law). 
23. See Metabolife Int’l, Inc. v. Wornick, 264 F.3d 832, 849 (9th Cir. 2001)
(quoting Masson, 501 U.S. at 517); Biospherics, Inc. v. Forbes, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 748, 
752 (D. Md. 1997) (quoting Masson, 501 U.S. at 517). 
24. See Premier Elec. Constr. Co. v. Morse/Diesel, Inc., 628 N.E.2d 1090, 1099 
(Ill. 1993) (“[A] common law fraud claim requires . . . that the misrepresentations must





















   
   
     
 






advertising,26 and estate fraud.27  In other words, the inquiry is whether
the actual audience perceived a given speech to be associated with a
specific false proposition.28 
The fact that different audiences may differently perceive the same
speech explains the result in a curious Pennsylvania Supreme Court
case, in which the court upheld a jury’s ruling that the same articles were
true when printed in the Philadelphia Inquirer but false when reprinted 
in a tabloid.29  This case demonstrates that the actual perception test of 
falsity makes the question of a speech’s truth or falsity highly sensitive
to the context of the speech.
However, the exact same courts sometimes reject an actual perception 
test of falsity.  In an obstruction of justice case brought under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1001, the Supreme Court held, 
It could be argued, perhaps, that a disbelieved falsehood does not pervert an 
investigation.  But making the existence of this crime turn upon the credulousness 
of the federal investigator (or the persuasiveness of the liar) would be 
exceedingly strange; such a defense to the analogous crime of perjury is certainly 
unheard of. 
“Grand jurors are free to disbelieve a witness and persevere in an investigation 
without immunizing a perjurer.”30 
Notable First Amendment treatise writers also sometimes call for
limitations on judges’ use of an actual perception test of falsity to identify
implicated propositions, fearing that it is more malleable and subject to 
judges’ personal proclivities and thus could result in more unlimited
25. See Med. Lab. Mgmt. Consultants v. Am. Broad. Cos., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1182,
1193 (D. Ariz. 1998) (quoting Masson, 501 U.S. at 517). 
26. See Time Warner Cable, Inc. v. DirecTV, Inc., 497 F.3d 144, 153 (2d Cir. 
2007); Rezec v. Sony Pictures Entm’t Co., 10 Cal. Rptr. 3d 333, 343 (Cal. App. 2004); 
SACK, supra note 22, at 138. 
27. In re Hollis’ Estate, 12 N.W.2d 576, 581 (Iowa 1944) (“In general, fraud
deceives the testator’s mind . . . .”).
28. 1 ROBERT D. SACK, SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED 
PROBLEMS § 2.4.5, at 2–34 (4th ed. 2010) (“A publisher is, in general, liable for the 
implications of what he or she has said or written, not merely the specific, literal statements
made.”).  Elsewhere, I have referred to propositions that are associated with a sufficiently
common audience perception of a speech as propositions that are “implicated” by that
speech.  See Christopher P. Guzelian, Scientific Speech, 93 IOWA L. REV. 881, 898–905 
(2008).
29. McDermott v. Biddle, 674 A.2d 665, 665–66, 669 (Pa. 1996). 
30. Brogan v. United States, 522 U.S. 398, 402 & n.1 (1998) (quoting United 
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liability than could be achieved through an alternative test—such as a 
“literal” test of falsity.31 
3. Similarly Situated Reasonable Audience False Perception 
Sometimes courts are not interested in the actual audience’s perception of
which proposition is at issue—indeed they expressly discount that 
perception—but instead focus upon whether a similarly situated reasonable
audience would associate a false proposition with a statement.32  The test 
of how reasonable audiences respond is quite commonplace in First
Amendment—and other—jurisprudence, ranging from Free Exercise 
Clause jurisprudence33 to cryptic student speech34 to tort cases involving 
awards of fear damages based on the reasonability of audience perception.35 
31. See 1 SACK, supra note 28, § 2.4.5, at 2–35 (decrying overuse of actual 
perception test in defamation cases).  See infra pp. 31–33 for a discussion of the literal 
test of falsity.
32. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000); Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
33. Free Exercise Clause cases are the First Amendment category in which the 
Court has expressly articulated an “objective” test of perception.  See Wallace, 472 U.S. 
at 76, 83 (stating the “objective observer” test). The objective observer supposedly has 
limited local knowledge of the scene in which the event occurred and is acquainted with 
the “text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute,” along with general principles 
of free exercise jurisprudence. Id. at 76; see also Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 
308 (endorsing O’Connor’s objective observer test). 
34. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401 (2007) (“Principal Morse thought the
banner would be interpreted by those viewing it as promoting illegal drug use, and that
interpretation is plainly a reasonable one.”).
35. See Williamson v. Waldman, 696 A.2d 14, 21 (N.J. 1997).  The Court in 
Williamson noted,
[I]n determining legal responsibility for emotional injury attributable to the 
fear of contracting AIDS. . . .  [P]ersistence of ignorance about AIDS . . . 
dominates the reasoning of . . . many courts . . . . Therefore, as a matter of
sound public policy, the standard of proximate cause should require as an 
element of the test of causation a level of knowledge of the etiology and risks 
of AIDS that can serve to overcome and effectively discourage the kind of
ignorance that nourishes the hysteria and irrational fear of contracting AIDS, 
which, in turn, perpetuate the prejudice and discrimination that surround the 
AIDS epidemic. . . . [T]he reasonableness standard should be enhanced by the 
imputation to a victim of emotional distress based on the fear of contracting
AIDS of that level of knowledge of the disease that is then-current, accurate, 
and generally available to the public. 
Id.; accord Pichowicz v. Hoyt, No. Civ. 92–388–M, 2000 WL 1480445, at *4 (D.N.H. 

























   
 
   
Take a recent Fourth Amendment example.  A state trooper stops a 
driver and says, “If the dog doesn’t indicate anything, then we’ll get you 
going,” immediately after which the trooper asked what the driver would 
“think about it if I had a dog come and go around the vehicle?”  The 
Eighth Circuit panel focused not on whether the actual driver believed 
those statements to associate with the proposition “You are free to leave 
if you wish,” but rather whether a similarly situated reasonable driver
could have understood from the trooper’s statement and question that the 
driver was free to leave.36 
Or take another case when a federal district court prohibited expert 
semiotic testimony that would have purported a fish symbol on a city
seal not to necessarily be indicative of Christianity.37 The court reasoned
that “the proper inquiry [is] how the average reasonable observer interprets 
the symbolic fish on the city seal of Republic.”38  Oddly, the court then 
proceeded to lay heavy emphasis on evidence that actual residents, not 
the average reasonable resident, believed the symbol to be Christian in
meaning. Thus, although the court articulated a similarly situated
reasonable observer test, it appears to have used an actual perception test.39 
4. Quantified False Perception 
One might surmise that an actual perception or similarly situated
reasonable observer test would mean that courts commonly use some
objective metric to establish what propositions audiences believed as a 
result of a speech.  However, this is not the case.  As Georgetown Professor
Rebecca Tushnet notes, “[T]he Supreme Court routinely fails to engage 
in any serious analysis of an audience’s perceptions, relying instead on 
often unarticulated guesses about what the audience would understand.”40 
Some courts—particularly in commercial speech or Sherman Act
antitrust cases involving false speech—seek to overcome this “thumb in
the air” approach to gauging audience perceptions of propositions by 
preponderance of the evidence that low level contaminants in their well caused neurotoxic 
effects, meaning their fears were “unreasonable”).
36. See United States v. Grant, 696 F.3d 780, 784 (8th Cir. 2012) (“The test for
whether a person has been ‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment is an 
‘objective standard’ that looks to whether a reasonable person would have believed that 
he was not free to leave.” (citing Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 574 (1988))). 
37. Webb v. City of Republic, Mo., 55 F. Supp. 2d 994, 998 (W.D. Mo. 1999). 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 999 (“Based on . . . especially the statements by the citizens of Republic
itself, the Court finds that no genuine issue of material fact remains in dispute on whether the
fish symbol on Republic’s city seal is a religious symbol.”).
40. Rebecca Tushnet, It Depends on What the Meaning of “False” Is: Falsity and
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requiring rigorous, well-designed market surveys of similarly situated
audiences—or even of the same audience under resampled conditions. 
If some minimum percentage of the audience or readership—fifteen to 
twenty percent—does not acquire a false perception of a specifically 
tested proposition because of the speech presented to it, the speech is 
considered true.41 
Yet despite these courts’ insistence that falsity is objectively measured
through well-crafted consumer surveys, some judges disfavor survey
usage—even in commercial speech cases—to quantify linguistic
perceptions of propositions.42  Indeed, Federal Seventh Circuit Judge
Richard Posner has referred to word surveys as products of the “black
arts,” believing them to be highly manipulable.43 
5. Literal Truth 
Both legislatures and courts sometimes invoke a literal test of falsity 
rather than an actual perception test, similarly situated reasonable perception
test, or quantified perception test.44  Courts and laws adopting this stance 
have, for example, 
41. See McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 226, 249 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (noting that courts depend on quantified perception (citing Johnson & Johnson–
Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm., Inc., 19 F.3d 125, 134 
n.14 (3d Cir. 1994); Johnson & Johnson * Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. Smithkline 
Beecham Corp., 960 F.2d 294, 298 (2d Cir. 1992))); cf. Heary Bros. Lightning Prot. Co. 
v. Lightning Prot. Inst., 287 F. Supp. 2d 1038, 1048 (D. Ariz. 2003) (“Different courts
have taken different positions on whether speech that is . . . false or misleading may 
constitute ‘improper’ or unreasonable conduct that can form the basis of antitrust
liability.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 262 F. App’x 815 (9th Cir. 2008).
42. See, e.g., In re Kraft, 114 F.T.C. 40, 136, 138 (1991) (invoking “reasonable 
consumer” test in commercial speech case but declining to adopt quantified perception 
approach), enforced, Kraft, Inc. v. F.T.C., 970 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1992); Res. 
Developers, Inc. v. Statue of Liberty-Ellis Island Found., Inc., 926 F.2d 134, 140 (2d Cir. 
1991) (rejecting market survey approach as unreliable and holding that “expenditure by a 
competitor of substantial funds in an effort to deceive consumers . . . justifies the
existence of a presumption that consumers are, in fact, being deceived” (quoting U-Haul
Int’l, Inc. v. Jartran Inc., 793 F.2d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 1986)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted)).
43. Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Balt. Football Club Ltd., 34 F.3d 410, 416 
(7th Cir. 1994). 
44. See, e.g., Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 268 (Cal. 2002) (Brown, J., 
dissenting). Justice Brown wrote, 
[Consider statutes that] “prohibit not only advertising which is false, but also












   






 permitted damages for false statements during a political 
candidacy only for literal falsehoods;45 
 enjoined “facially false” hair product advertisements “without 
regard to consumer reaction”;46 and 
 sanctioned the marking of products with false patent numbers 
only for literally falsely printed patent numbers.47 
Even for literal speech, there can be disagreement about what proposition 
is at issue. Two people hearing the same speaker might derive different 
meanings from the same words based on, say, perceived intonation. 
There is, after all, a marked difference in which proposition should be
associated with each of two spoken variants of two near identical literal
expressions: 
(A) “The panda comes in the room and eats shoots and leaves.” 
(B) “The panda comes in the room and eats, shoots, and leaves.” 
If the speech were in written form, the court might take care and
distinguish the two. If the speech were in audible form, a party may not 
have such luck in convincing a court that the relevant proposition was A, 
not B—or vice versa—despite identical wording of the oral speech.48 
capacity, likelihood or tendency to deceive or confuse the public.” This broad 
definition of actionable speech puts a corporation “at the mercy of the varied 
understanding of [its] hearers and consequently of whatever inference may be 
drawn as to [its] intent and meaning.”  Because the corporation could never be 
sure whether its [literally] truthful statements may deceive or confuse the
public and would likely incur significant burden and expense in litigating the 
issue, “[m]uch valuable information which a corporation might be able to 
provide would remain unpublished. . . .”  As the United States Supreme Court 
has consistently held, such a result violates the First Amendment. 
Id. at 272 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of 
Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785 n.21 (1978); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 535 
(1945); Kasky, 45 P.3d at 250 (majority opinion)).  Elsewhere I have suggested that a
literalist approach of falsity is not preferable in false speech litigation. See Christopher 
P. Guzelian, True and False Speech, 51 B.C. L. REV. 669, 683–95 (2010). 
45. See In re Chmura, 626 N.W.2d 876, 887 (Mich. 2001). 
46. Vidal Sassoon, Inc. v. Bristol-Meyers Co., 661 F.2d 272, 277 (2d Cir. 1981). 
47. 35 U.S.C. § 292 (2006). 
48. This is not silly wordplay; the debate about which is the correct proposition to
associate with the Second Amendment turns in part on placement of a single comma in 
some variants of the original document, even though the comma is lacking in others.
Compare U.S. CONST. amend. II, with A Century of Lawmaking for a New Nation: U.S. 
Congressional Documents and Debates, 1774-1875, AM. MEMORY FROM THE LIBR. OF 
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Even if there is perfect agreement about the literal speech, there can 
still be dissent about what the appropriately associated proposition is. 
Consider a speaker who says, 
“Barney is gay!”
If the speaker is referencing a 1960s Flintstones character, he might be 
expressing the character’s joy and happiness.  A different speaker might
instead be asserting Barney’s homosexuality. If Barney filed a defamation 
lawsuit against the speaker or those who publicized the statement, a
literalist approach without intensive contextual inquiry could not aid the 
decision of which proposition to associate. 
6. Subjective Intent 
Sometimes courts gauge falsity by the speaker’s subjective intent to 
render a false message:
 “[T]he Court has been careful to instruct that falsity alone may 
not suffice to bring the speech outside the First Amendment. 
The statement must be a knowing or reckless falsehood”;49 
 “[A]ctual deception [is not] necessary to establish mail fraud 
if the defendant had the conscious intent to defraud”;50 
 “‘[F]alsely,’ [as used] in a criminal statute, suggests something 
more than a mere untruth and includes . . . [the] ‘intent to 
defraud’”;51 
 “In jurisprudence, . . . the word ‘false’ implies something more 
than mere untruth: it imports knowledge and a specific intent 
to deceive”;52 
 To make “false statements” in an application for a driver’s 
license requires guilty knowledge as an essential element of 
the offense;53 and 
49. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2545 (2012) (plurality opinion). 
50. United States v. Svete, 556 F.3d 1157, 1166 (11th Cir. 2009). 
51. United States v. Achtner, 144 F.2d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 1944) (quoting Dombroski 
v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 19 A.2d 678, 680 (N.J. 1941); United States v. Otey, 31 F. 68, 70 
(C.C.D. Or. 1887)).
52. State v. Tedesco, 397 A.2d 1352, 1358 (Conn. 1978). 























   
 
 Falsely means willfully untrue, showing consciousness of guilt.54 
Courts that have invoked the subjective intent test of falsity occasionally 
go so far as to claim the test is the default test of falsity.55 
7. Legislative or Agency Definition 
Finally, truthfulness may be judged by whether a speech conforms to a 
statutory or regulatory definition. For instance, the Dolphin Protection 
Consumer Information Act indicates the phrase “dolphin safe tuna” is a
false label “if the product contains tuna harvested . . . on the high seas by
a vessel engaged in driftnet fishing” or tuna harvested “outside the eastern 
tropical Pacific Ocean by a vessel using purse seine nets” that are not
dolphin safe.56  Yet the Act offers a speaker no opportunity to rely upon 
audience perception in arguing the truthfulness of the speech; falsity is
determined by whether the speech meets the statutory definition.  Whether 
that statutory definition represents common or actual public perception 
of the phrase “dolphin safe tuna” and is therefore an “efficient” definition 
typically remains an untested premise.57 
Many similar statutory or regulatory definitional truths exist: “safe and
effective” pharmaceuticals,58 “organic” food,59 appropriate labeling of 
specific products as “sports bags,” “toys,” “baseball equipment,”
“backpacks,”60 “pro forma” financial disclosures under the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act,61 and a myriad of other definitions.
It is also unclear whether courts should give deference to legislative or 
regulatory stipulations about false speech.  The Fifth Circuit struck down 
Louisiana’s “Cajun” statute, which defined all fish sold in Louisiana 
54. See City of Boston v. Santosuosso, 30 N.E.2d 278, 304–05 (Mass. 1940). 
55. State v. Monastero, 424 N.W.2d 837, 848 (Neb. 1988) (“Courts have generally
determined that the word false or falsely means ‘intentionally untrue’ or deceitful, implying
an intention to perpetrate a fraud.”).
56. 16 U.S.C. § 1385 (2012). 
57. Cf. Tushnet, supra note 40, at 248–49. 
58. Ass’n of Am. Physicians & Surgeons v. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., 226 F.
Supp. 2d 204, 206 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2000)). 
59. 7 C.F.R. §§ 205.200–.299 (2013) (detailing extensive USDA requirements for
the production and processing of food sold as “organic”). 
60. Processed Plastic Co. v. United States, 29 Ct. Int’l Trade 1129 passim (2005);
Minnetonka Brands v. United States, 24 Ct. Int’l Trade 645 passim (2000); New York
Merch. Co. v. United States, 294 F. Supp. 971, 976 (Cust. Ct. 1969). 
61. 15 U.S.C. § 7261(b) (2012) (authorizing regulatory framework for pro forma
financial disclosures that depart from generally accepted accounting principles); see also
Henry T. C. Hu, Too Complex To Depict? Innovation, “Pure Information,” and the SEC 
Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601, 1610, 1619 n.51 (2012) (citing 15 U.S.C. 
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under the marking “Cajun” to be catfish of Louisiana origin.62 
Consequently, a company using the marking for fish imported from China
that were a different species than domestic catfish was free to continue
its use of the term Cajun.63  The Fifth Circuit reasoned that because the
importer was largely selling to wholesalers and clearly labeled the product’s
country of origin, there was little risk of actual deception—an actual
perception test of falsity—and thus, Louisiana’s law was invalid as applied 
to the importer.64 
By inexplicable contrast, a California appeals court deferred to a
restrictive California statute that required any product sold in California
and labeled “Made in the USA” not only to be manufactured in the 
United States but to have its component parts manufactured in the 
United States.65 
Thus, even when legislatures ostensibly decree what proposition should 
be associated with a specific “term of art” speech, some courts apparently 
do not feel compelled to limit or conform their false speech inquiries to
that proposition, but others do.
A. Case Study of the “Association” Problem:         
The Stolen Valor Act 
United States v. Strandlof was a Tenth Circuit case among several
recently before the courts centering on the Stolen Valor Act (SVA).66 
The SVA criminally penalized anyone who “falsely represent[ed]” to
have been awarded military honors.67 Rick Strandlof was a Colorado 
man who had never served in the military, yet claimed significant military
honors as a Marine in Iraq, resulting in a leadership role in several volunteer 
veterans’ fundraising organizations and meetings with numerous state 
and federal politicians.68  In a sister case in the Ninth Circuit, United 
62. Piazza’s Seafood World, LLC v. Odom, 448 F.3d 744, 746, 753 (5th Cir. 2006). 
63. See id. at 745–46, 753. 
64. Id. at 753. 
65. Benson v. Kwikset Corp., 62 Cal. Rptr. 3d 284, 293, 295–95 (Cal. App. 2007). 
66. 667 F.3d 1146, 1151 (10th Cir. 2012), abrogated by United States v. Alvarez, 
132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012), and vacated, 684 F.3d 962 (10th Cir. 2012). 
67. 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2012). 
68. Strandlof, 667 F.3d at 1151–52; see also Fake Military Veteran Hid Under 
‘Ocean of Lies,’ CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/06/11/veteran.imposter/ (last 
updated June 12, 2009, 1:05 PM) (“He canvassed Colorado appearing at the sides of






























States v. Alvarez, the defendant Xavier Alvarez claimed as part of an 
election victory speech for a position on a municipal water board that he
had won the Congressional Medal of Honor, when he had not.69 
Within the text of the SVA, there is no mention of how to determine 
whether a given speech about military honors is false.70  By the SVA’s 
omission of an explicit definition, we can surmise that Congress ruled
out a statutory definition approach to defining falsity.  The SVA’s silence
presumably means it is up to a court to decide.  An experiential approach 
would lead to conclusions about truth or falsity as varied as are judges’ 
personal judgments. If a judge instead chooses a subjective intent test of
falsity, Strandlof and Alvarez were guilty—most likely.  If a judge chooses
a literal falsity approach, Strandlof and Alvarez were likewise guilty, as 
they did not win military honors.71 
However, the prosecutor in Strandlof did not allege that Strandlof’s 
audience was ultimately fooled by his representations—an actual perception 
approach—nor did he allege that a reasonable audience or quantified 
percentage of a reasonable or the actual audience was or would have been 
fooled by his misrepresentations—similarly situated reasonable audience
perception—or by quantified false perception approaches.72  Indeed, 
Alvarez in particular did not fool his audience by his misrepresentations 
of winning the Congressional Medal of Honor.73  It appears they in fact 
reported him to the FBI for his misrepresentations.74  Thus, application 
of an actual perception test would resoundingly determine that Alvarez 
did not speak falsely.
We see that depending on which method of association a court selects,
a different conclusion—whether the speech is true or false, or even
whether an inquiry into falsity is philosophically justifiable or possible—can 
be reached.75  It may be that different speech contexts require different 
methods. But without clear First Amendment explanation of when and
why one specific criterion for association is selected over another, the
choice is arbitrary, and it is impossible to predict whether one’s speech
is true or false, and in turn, protected or potentially unprotected. 
See Dan Frosch & James Dao, A Military Deception, Made Easier by a Reluctance To 
Ask Questions, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2009, at A10.
69. 617 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2357 (2012) (plurality 
opinion).
70. See 18 U.S.C. § 704 (2012). 
71. See Strandlof, 667 F.3d at 1151; Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1200. 
72. See Strandlof, 667 F.3d at 1151–52 (noting that local veterans suspected
Strandlof and subsequently reported him to the FBI). 
73. Alvarez, 617 F.3d at 1201. 
74. Id. 
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III. PROPOSITIONS: THE TRUTH OR LIE BEHIND THE SPEECH 
Let us now turn to a short discourse on truth.  Wishing to avoid simply
restating a philosophy treatise,76 this Article offers only a few prefatory 
comments about propositions and then turns to some practical evidence
about related courtroom controversies. 
We saw previously that the court must first associate a proposition 
with an allegedly offending instance of false speech. A secondary typical 
inquiry by courts, once they have so associated a proposition, is to 
determine whether the proposition is true or false.77 
76. Here is an important up-front confession: I am mostly self-educated in 
philosophy, deferring gladly and respectfully to my academic colleagues who are vastly
superior in breadth and depth of study. See Mark Oppenheimer, The Philosopher 
Kingmaker, BOSTON GLOBE (Apr. 20, 2008), http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/ideas/articles
/2008/04/20/the_philosopher_kingmaker/?page=full (summarizing lively academic disputes
about philosophy and its relation to jurisprudence).  Initially, I drafted for this Article a 
summarizing, illustrative survey of philosophical controversies related to the topic of 
truth.  I decided to redact this material given space limitations and desire for readability.
Had I included a more robust philosophical summary herein, my aim would have been 
only to muster evidence that there is extensive disagreement among academics as to
whether and how to determine the truth of any given proposition.  Some eminent legal
philosophers claim—perhaps rightly so—that if I were to set cautious pen to paper about 
these disputes, the very fact that I am doing so—and the content that I would select, 
perhaps errantly, to support my contentions—might truthfully say more about my
temperament than about deriving answers about propositions’ truthfulness.  See Brian
Leiter, In Praise of Realism (and Against “Nonsense” Jurisprudence), 100 GEO. L.J. 
865, 883–84 (2012). 
77. See infra note 83.  Doug Groothuis provides a summarization of this classical 
understanding of true belief and speech.  He writes, 
    Our beliefs and statements concern propositions about reality.  We either assent 
to them, deny them or suspend judgment about them.  Reality or actuality concerns 
objects or states of affairs, either real or imaginary.  D. Elton Trueblood gives 
a helpful breakdown: 
Minds may be knowing or ignorant. 
Propositions may be true or false. 
Objects may be real or imaginary.
For example, unicorns are imaginary objects; therefore, the proposition “Unicorns
do not exist” is true, and when my mind assents to this proposition, I know it to 
be true. 
DOUGLAS GROOTHUIS, TRUTH DECAY: DEFENDING CHRISTIANITY AGAINST THE CHALLENGES 
OF POSTMODERNISM 89 (2000) (footnote omitted) (quoting DAVID ELTON TRUEBLOOD, 
GENERAL PHILOSOPHY 47 (Baker Book House 1976) (1963)). Under this classical 
definition of true speech, false speech would be its negation: speech that reflects as
correct—or incorrect—a correspondingly false—or true—proposition about a real or
imaginary object.
37











    
  
   





      
   
     








Even here I must pause and acknowledge that my bias and temperament 
shines radiantly through by restricting a philosophical discussion about 
truth to propositions. Propositional truth is the classical conception of 
truth, but over time, a “truth divide” has grown and commonness of assent 
to this traditional approach to truth has waned.78  For instance, some
thinkers have come to the strong skeptical or agnostic conclusion that 
there is or may be no reality or truth beyond human power struggles or
language games.79  Others claim—either explicitly or implicitly—that
truth is relative and subjective and that there may not be a singular reality 
and truth—that the class of real objects and phenomena may vary with
the observer80 or that no generalizable truths exist because truth is a
contextually specific and highly complex social and power construct based 
on ethnicity, race, religion, gender, class, et cetera that results in multiple 
coexistent truths.81 
Acknowledging these and other alternatives, but in defense of classicism, 
most judges still write as if they adhere to classicism, believing there is a 
single objective reality, typically reducible to articulable and answerable 
propositional form.82  Propositions under the classical view have a unique
truth-value:83 they can be (1) true—a fact or a certainty; (2) false—an 
impossibility or a falsehood; or (3) uncertain—an uncertainty.84  Even  
78. See GROOTHUIS, supra note 77, at 11. 
79. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense, in THE 
PORTABLE NIETZSCHE 42, 46–47 (Walter Kaufmann ed. & trans., 1954). 
80. See, e.g., NELSON GOODMAN, WAYS OF WORLDMAKING 3–4 (1978) (taking an
agnostic “irrealist” stance as to the existence of a reality independent of the observer); 1 
RICHARD RORTY, OBJECTIVITY, RELATIVISM, AND TRUTH: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 1, 12– 
13, 17 (1991) (arguing that objective perceptions of reality are unnecessary).
81. See, e.g., Michel Foucault, The Subject and Power, 8 CRITICAL INQUIRY 777, 
792–93 (1982).
82. For instance, see Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic
Contract Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1743, 1750–51 (2000), for a discussion of judicial
classicism in contract law. 
83. There is a class of propositions, known as “liar paradoxes,” for which it is not
clear whether there is a truth-value.  See R. M. SAINSBURY, PARADOXES 128–29 (3d ed.
2009) (describing and analyzing the liar paradox exemplified by statements such as “What I
am now saying is false”). For instance, “This sentence is false,” if true, is false. See id.
If false, it is true.  See id. Liar paradoxes are not propositions relevant in courts, to my
knowledge. Also some have tried to show that there are mathematical “supervaluations” 
of truth-values that appear neither true nor false, but it has been cautioned not always to
equate such mathematical niceties with actual truth.  See Nuel Belnap, Truth Values, 
Neither-True-Nor-False, and Supervaluations, 91 STUDIA LOGICA 305, 333 (2009). 
84. See GOTTLOB FREGE, Über Sinn und Bedeutung, 100 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
PHILOSOPHIE UND PHILOSOPHISCHE KRITIK 25 (1892), in THE FREGE READER 151, 157–58 
(Michael Beaney ed., 1997).  From the standpoint of an omniscient being, a truth-value 
may never be deemed uncertain, but from a human or limited being’s perspective, we often
must entertain the possibility of the category, which deviates from Frege’s original conception 
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among classical proponents, however, some contend that truth-values are 
not binary—true or false—but that there are degrees of truth and falsity. 
For example, truth-values could be “extremely true,” “substantially true,” or
“somewhat false.”85 
Classically, one can also distinguish three categories of philosophically 
and legally relevant propositions:
(1) data propositions—sensory claims, whether directly or
indirectly sensed through the five senses or augmentations 
thereof, for example, “We ‘saw’ a bottom quark using the
electron microscope,” or testimonial claims based on sensory 
claims, for example, “The eyewitness told me he saw the
man draw a gun and shoot the victim in the chest”;86 
(2) causation propositions—relational claims of cause and result, 
for example, “Smoking causes lung cancer,” scientific; or
“Increases in a product’s supply, all else being equal, decreases 
its price,” social-scientific; or “Workers of the world unite, for
a worker’s paradise will be brought about by the continued
oppression by capitalists,” historical;87 and 
logic was pioneered by Łukasiewicz, JAN ŁUKASIEWICZ, SELECTED WORKS 153 (L.
Borkowski ed., 1970), and expanded upon by Gödel, 1 KURT GÖDEL, Zum Intuitionistischen
Aussagenkalkül, in  KURT GÖDEL COLLECTED WORKS 222, 222–25 (Solomon Feferman 
ed., 1986).
85. See L. A. Zadeh, Fuzzy Logic and Approximate Reasoning, 30 SYNTHESE 407, 
407–10, 415 (1975); accord Bustos v. A&E Television Networks, 646 F.3d 762, 762 
(10th Cir. 2011) (finding that a defamatory proposition “may not be precisely true, [but] 
it is substantially true. And that is enough to call an end to this litigation as a matter of
law”).
86. See Guzelian, supra note 28, at 885. 
87. See id.; accord Christopher Robertson, When Truth Cannot Be Presumed: The 
Regulation of Drug Promotion Under an Expanding First Amendment, 94 B.U. L. REV. 
545, 546 (2014) (opining that courts should defer to Food and Drug Administration
clinical trial standards in determining questions of causation for pharmaceutical marketing). 
There are extensive controversies as to whether history is open to causal analysis. See,
e.g., LUDWIG VON MISES, MARXISM UNMASKED: FROM DELUSION TO DESTRUCTION 
(2006) (discussing the merits of socialism and capitalism).  Mises wrote, 
Hegel was the man who destroyed German thinking and German philosophy
for more than a century, at least.  He found a warning in Immanuel Kant . . . 
who said the philosophy of history can only be written by a man who has the 
courage to pretend that he sees the world with the eyes of God.  Hegel believed 
he had the “eyes of God,” that he knew the end of history, that he knew the 
plans of God.
Id. at 8–9.  Similarly, Popper stated, 
39




   
  
 
    
     




   
 
 
    
 
    














   
     
    
      
  
 
(3) viewpoints—propositions that may not necessarily have
truth-values associated with them, for example, aesthetic
propositions such as “Blue is the most beautiful color.”88 
[S]elective approaches fulfil[l] functions in the study of history which are in
some ways analogous to those of theories in science.  It is therefore understandable 
that they have often been taken for theories. And indeed, those rare ideas inherent 
in these approaches which can be formulated in the form of testable hypotheses, 
whether singular or universal, may well be treated as scientific hypotheses.  But as
a rule, these historical ‘approaches’ or ‘points of view’ cannot be tested. They
cannot be refuted, and apparent confirmations are therefore of no value, even if
they are as numerous as the stars in the sky.  We shall call such a selective point of
view or focus of historical interest, if it cannot be formulated as a testable
hypothesis, a historical interpretation. 
Historicism mistakes these interpretations for theories. This is one of its 
cardinal errors. 
KARL R. POPPER, THE POVERTY OF HISTORICISM 151 (Harper & Row 1964) (1957). 
88. Even for matters of aesthetics, widely considered to be a matter of taste, some
insist that there are truths to discover or ignore.  Consider architect Frank Lloyd Wright’s 
thoughts about beauty:
Nature . . . alone can save us from the hopeless confusion of ideas that has 
resulted in the view that beauty is a matter of caprice, that it is merely a freak 
of imagination—to one man divine, to another hideous, to another meaningless. 
We are familiar with the assertion, that, should a man put eleven stovepipe hats 
on top of the cornice of his building and find them beautiful, why then they are 
beautiful. Yes, perhaps to him; but the only possible conclusion is, that, like 
the eleven hats on the cornice, he is not beautiful, because beauty to him is
utter violation of all the harmonies of any sequence or consequence of his own
nature. To find inorganic things of no truth of relation beautiful is but to
demonstrate the lack of beauty in oneself and one’s unfitness for any office in 
administering the beautiful and to provide another example of the stultification 
that comes from the confusion of the curious with the beautiful.
Education seems to leave modern man less able than the savage to draw the 
line between these qualities.
Frank Lloyd Wright, Ausgeführte Bauten und Entwürfe von Frank Lloyd Wright (1910),
reprinted in 1 FRANK LLOYD WRIGHT COLLECTED WRITINGS 101, 105 (Bruce Brooks 
Pfeiffer ed., 1992). 
This dispute also occurs sometimes for moral propositions.  See, e.g., ALFRED JULES 
AYER, LANGUAGE, TRUTH, AND LOGIC (Dover Publ’ns 1952) (1946) (conceptualizing 
different truth-values); R. M. HARE, MORAL THINKING: ITS LEVELS, METHOD, AND POINT
(1981) (discussing the properties of moral language); CHARLES L. STEVENSON, ETHICS 
AND LANGUAGE (1944) (characterizing the meaning of moral terms).  For instance, if one 
says, “Murder is a wrong,” a data proposition, or “Murder is a wrong that must be 
punishable by death,” a moral causal proposition, these are sometimes said to be viewpoints—
value judgments not associated with a truth-value.  Courts certainly do not recognize them as
such, as all U.S. courts agree that murder is wrong. Also, the question of whether objective 
moral truths can exist independently of a mind or an evaluator of them is contended. See 
generally  WILLIAM LANE CRAIG & WALTER SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, GOD? A DEBATE 
BETWEEN A CHRISTIAN AND AN ATHEIST (2004) (debating the existence of “God”). In
describing the Court’s disdain for viewpoint discrimination, Justice Brennan once stated,
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Clearly, for potentially legally relevant propositions drawn from topics 
ranging from religion, science, social sciences, history, and mathematics
to the arts, et cetera, true answers to data propositions—whether an 
eyewitness really remembered the scene correctly—and causation
propositions—whether a pharmaceutical caused liver toxicity—are
indispensible in resolving false speech cases. Equally wise judicial restraint 
knows not to seek or demand answers for viewpoints for which there is
no known or knowable truth.  Yet for many legally relevant propositions, 
there is widespread disagreement whether to assign a truth-value, and if 
so, which.
We could put the issue another way: any reliable judicial classification 
of a historical instance of speech as “false speech” presupposes the court 
as having competently considered and answered for the associated
proposition, or propositions, relevant questions of (1) ontology, whether 
the phenomenon described by the proposition exists and is knowable,
(2) epistemology, whether the proposition’s truth-value is known, and 
(3) methodology, how that truth-value is known.  For instance, in deciding
whether a scientific speech is false—“The extensive worldwide release
of chlorofluorocarbons causes a hole in the ozone layer”—one cannot
reliably reach a conclusion without a court’s analysis of an associated
proposition, which in this instance, might be the same statement as the 
speech itself and its truth-value, known to be true, false, or uncertain by 
a reliable method.89 
Finally and importantly, a great number of disagreements about the 
truth-values of propositions occur—as evidenced in philosophical 
controversies treatises90—because some evaluators adopt either broadly 
or narrowly (1) blind faith in the validity of a certain truth-value, true,
false, or uncertain, for instance, there are a variety of seemingly
irreconcilable divides between various naturalist and religious adherents
based on certain propositions’ truthiness,91 or (2) some form of philosophical 
or methodological skepticism.92 
that discriminates among viewpoints threatens the continued vitality of ‘free speech.’” 
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 62 (1983) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting).
89. See Guzelian, supra note 28, at 885. 
90. See infra notes 91–92. 
91. Compare  RICHARD DAWKINS, THE GOD DELUSION 227 (2006) (arguing that 
God does not exist and is not needed to ensure humans act in morally acceptable ways),
and SAM HARRIS, LETTER TO A CHRISTIAN NATION 89–90 (2006) (arguing that Christians
fail to embrace reality), with FRANCIS S. COLLINS, THE LANGUAGE OF GOD: A SCIENTIST 
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PRESENTS EVIDENCE FOR BELIEF 5–6 (2006) (arguing that a scientist may be believe in
both God and science), C. S. LEWIS, MIRACLES: A PRELIMINARY STUDY 67–73
(HarperCollins 2001) (1947) (accepting God’s existence and exploring the nature of
miracles), and 1 AUGUSTINE, THE LITERAL MEANING OF GENESIS, in 42 ANCIENT 
CHRISTIAN WRITERS 1, 7 (Johannes Quasten et al. eds., John Hammond Taylor trans., 
1982) (examining God’s creation of men and their souls).  Some differentiate scientific
and social scientific knowledge from all other forms of “knowledge”—such as
philosophy, morality, religion, politics, or ethics—because knowledge of the latter cannot be
proven by empirical methods or logic and is therefore largely subjective.  See, e.g.,
David Barnhizer, Roe v. Wade and the Conflict Between Legal, Political and Religious 
Truth (Cleveland-Marshall Coll. of Law, Working Paper No. 05-104, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=684161 (acknowledging different forms of truth).  Others disagree 
with this assessment.  See, e.g., MICHAEL HUEMER, ETHICAL INTUITIONISM 99, 103, 123 
(2005) (contending that there is objective, knowable moral truth).  These authors appeal 
to various human “intuitions” to demonstrate that objective truth and knowledge exist in
nonscientific fields of inquiry. See id.  The Catholic Church investigates and decides the
veracity of reported miracles as part of a saint’s beatification, yet Kierkegaard and Hume
contended that even if such events exist, there is no reliable method for knowing them to
be true. See DAVID HUME, AN INQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 173 (Charles 
W. Hendel ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1982) (1748) (“If we take in our hand any volume—of 
divinity or school metaphysics, for instance—let us ask, Does it contain any abstract 
reasoning concerning quantity or number?  No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning 
concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames, for it can contain
nothing but sophistry and illusion.”); Jyrki Kivelä, Kierkegaard on Miracles: Introductory
Observations, 43 SØREN KIERKEGAARD NEWSL. (Howard & Edna Hong Kierkegaard
Library), Feb. 2002, at 11, 13 (citing 3 SØREN KIERKEGAARD’S JOURNALS AND PAPERS 198
(Howard V. Hong & Edna H. Hong eds. & trans., 1975)).  But see LEWIS, supra note 91,
at 3–5 (arguing that miracles can be true). 
92. Consider as example the methodological skeptics.  There are various schools of 
skeptics who contend that many empirical propositions are unknowable—and thus 
unknown—precisely because no consistent empirical method exists by which to extract 
or create knowledge. See Gary Lawson, Efficiency and Individualism, 42 DUKE L.J. 53,
70 n.55 (1992) (noting the skepticism of Austrian economists regarding empirical work 
in economics); Nancy S. Marder, Bringing Jury Instructions into the Twenty-First
Century, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 449, 470–72 (2006) (discussing judges’ skepticism 
about empirical methodologies in regards to studies about jury instructions). Witness 
Nietzsche, who claimed that scientific claims are but metaphors hardened into truths,
FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense, in PHILOSOPHY AND 
TRUTH: SELECTIONS FROM NIETZSCHE’S NOTEBOOKS OF THE EARLY 1870’S, at 79, 79–97 
(Daniel Breazeale ed. & trans., 1979), or Feyerabend, who believed that there is no
philosophical method for differentiating scientific and mythological propositions, PAUL 
FEYERABEND, AGAINST METHOD: OUTLINE OF AN ANARCHISTIC THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE 
296 (1975); cf. MICHAEL HUEMER, SKEPTICISM AND THE VEIL OF PERCEPTION (2001)
(providing a readable overview of skepticism and a direct realist’s rebuttal to it).  Still 
others—Rorty and Kuhn—have posited that what is known does not necessarily, or even
often, correspond with what is true—if there even is a truth. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE 
STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 170–71 (3d ed. 1996); Richard Rorty, Univ. of 
Va., From Logic to Language to Play (Nov. 10–15, 1985), in 59 PROC. & ADDRESSES 
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A. Courtroom Controversies About Propositions
(1) Deciding what truth is, (2) whether truth is knowable, (3) whether 
it is known, and (4) how to reliably know the truth may at a glance seem 
more appropriate inquiries for philosophers than judges.  But law cannot 
escape these pressing questions of how to resolve philosophical questions of
truth if it aspires to “seek truth” in First Amendment false speech cases.93 
Most imaginable philosophical controversies about truth do arise in real
court cases.
Take, for example, contextualism—the concept that both the meaning
of a proposition and the truth-values associated with the proposition’s
meaning are context dependent.  Courts frequently have to wade through 
contextualism issues. Think simply of all the Supreme Court’s 
constitutional interpretation every term.94  Or, if a person can be punished
only for making “true threats,” must the court take into account evidence 
of prior racial hostility by the speaker to show that a lengthy rant about 
racial superiority, including a mention of imminent attacks against 
minority targets, was, in fact, equivalent to a direct, intentional threat?95 
Or consider a case in which a legislature has created the following
proposition: a “security” is any “certificate or instrument” permitting 
title or interest in others’ assets, including “any investment contract.”96 
Did the legislature intend an oral investment contract to be a “security?”97 
Or if a state’s law mandates its state courts to “recognize” other states’
laws as a matter of comity, does the word recognize mean that the court
can assume the other state has such laws and thus apply them, or must
the court first inquire about the existence and substance of those laws for 
93. See supra note 1. 
94. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2551 (2012) (Breyer, J., 
concurring); Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 395 (1997)
(Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Words take on meaning from 
context.”); see also ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE LAW 38, 49, 65, 95, 115 (1997) (offering Justice Scalia’s originalist theory of 
statutory and constitutional interpretation, along with commentaries by Gordon Wood,
Laurence Tribe, Mary Ann Glendon, and Ronald Dworkin on alternative methods of
interpretation).
95. See United States v. Viefhaus, 168 F.3d 392, 398 (10th Cir. 1999). 
96. See Gutmann v. Feldman, 97 Ohio St. 3d 473, 2002-Ohio-6721, 780 N.E.2d 
562, at ¶ 11 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.01(B) (West 2002)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
97. See id. ¶ 2. 
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a particular state before “recognizing” them?98  Or let us say a scientist-
CEO in a public press release to investment analysts touts his company’s
drug undergoing government regulatory approval as showing statistically
significant success in treating the lung disease of a particular patient subset. 
The press release omits mention that aggregate treatment data were
statistically insignificant taken across all study populations, suggesting the 
drug’s general invalidity.  Furthermore, the particular “responsive” subgroup 
highlighted in the press release was identified by retrospective analysis—a
scientifically irregular or even unacceptable practice, commonly understood 
as such by fellow scientists, in which a subgroup showing positive response
to the drug is identified only after the study is complete.  If the press 
release does not identify that the subgroup was retrospectively identified, 
is the scientist-CEO’s press release contextually tantamount to criminal
fraud?99 
Beyond contextual problems, there surface any number of varieties of
skepticism—and rebuttals thereto—in false speech and other court cases.
Cases are rare in which judges, pragmatic as they usually are, express
radical skepticism about truth’s very existence.  Even so, some chagrined 
jurists apparently have their semiprivate doubts.100  Other judges, however, 
are clearly on record as believers that truth does exist and is a guiding 
principle of society and law, even if truth is not always knowable or 
known.101  For moral questions in particular, even Supreme Court Justices
98. See Beard v. Viene, 826 P.2d 990, 993 (Okla. 1992). 
99. See David Brown, The Press-Release Conviction of a Biotech CEO and Its Impact 
on Scientific Research, WASH. POST (Sept. 23, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
national/health-science/the-press-release-crime-of-a-biotech-ceo-and-its-impact-on-scientific- 
research/2013/09/23/9b4a1a32-007a-11e3-9a3e-916de805f65d_story.html; see also Neeley v.
Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc., No. 4:11-CV-325 JAR (E.D. Mo. July 29, 2013) (holding that 
publisher of drug risk manual can be liable to patients for publication of false information). 
100. See Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1225 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (“[W]hat is ‘truth’ today is often shown to be error tomorrow.  The fact finder may
or may not arrive at [truth], but that problem is inherent in any judicial undertaking
because an undisputed knowledge of fact is largely unobtainable.”); Stidham v. City of
Whitefish, 746 P.2d 591, 598 (Mont. 1987) (Fillner, J., dissenting) (“I am convinced that
the majority’s opinion is motivated by a search for truth, but what is truth?  I rather
believe that a lawsuit is a search for justice under the law.”); see also infra pp. 30–31
(quoting Judge Sack).
101. See, e.g., Traxler v. Ford Motor Co., 576 N.W.2d 398 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998)
(Gribbs, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Judge Gribbs writes, 
Lawsuits are not activities to generate fees, games to be won, or theater to entertain.
Lawsuits are searches for the truth of who did what and who is to be accountable 
for the consequences.  Given the complexities of human affairs, the truth
cannot always be found, but the fair search for it is why courts, lawyers and
lawsuits exist. When it is found, the truth must be revered, and one answer to
the question, “What is truth?” must always be, “What is expected,” which means
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have significantly differed as to basic questions of truth’s existence, such
as whether there is “natural” law.102 
Besides radical skepticism, courts also divide over ontology— 
whether a particular proposition’s truth-value is or ever will be knowable.103 
That some legally relevant truth-values remain permanently unknowable 
should seem obvious.  For instance, courts acknowledge that how a jury
reached its verdict is, for legal purposes, a permanently unknowable, 
impenetrable “black box,”104 and they sensibly recognize that the death of 
a lone eyewitness likely precludes future hope of resolving key questions 
of fact.105  Courts also recognize that the answers to some particular
propositions are presently unknowable for lack of a technical method
necessary for acquiring that knowledge.  For instance, what lies subsurface
before mining operations begin?106 
Even upon rendering judgment, however, a court sometimes openly
confesses its belief that legally material propositions were unknowable 
and that it has resorted to guesswork to resolve the controversy.107 
Others facing the same perceived dilemma take the opposite approach. 
Id. at 405 n.1; see also People ex rel. Mirsberger v. Miller, 46 N.Y.S.2d 206, 209 (Mag.
Ct. 1943) (“Since men must live in a regulated society, certain truths are accepted as 
norms of conduct, but, essentially, we seek to approximate absolute truth.  The absolute 
truth is almost like the infinite.  Since man cannot live without ideals, a well informed mind 
and a sensitive soul recoils from the cynicism of sophists like Gorgias and Protagoras, 
who held that there was no such thing as truth.”). 
102. Compare S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(“The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky . . . .”), and FRANCIS 
BIDDLE, JUSTICE HOLMES, NATURAL LAW, AND THE SUPREME COURT: THE OLIVER 
WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE LECTURES, 1960, at 49 (1961) (“[M]en make their own laws; 
. . . these laws do not flow from some mysterious omnipresence in the sky, and . . . 
judges are not independent mouthpieces of the infinite . . . .”), with CLARENCE THOMAS, 
MY GRANDFATHER’S SON: A MEMOIR 231 (2007) (“Why shouldn’t a federal judge be 
interested in what the Founders thought about natural law . . . ?”).
103. See II THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 803 (Christopher Berry
Gray ed., 1999). 
104. See, e.g., Place v. Abbott Labs., 215 F.3d 803, 808–09 (7th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 648–49 (2d Cir. 1946). 
105. See Squilache v. Tidewater Coal & Coke Co., 62 S.E. 446, 450–51 (W. Va. 
1908); cf. Farmer v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 368 So. 2d 487, 491 (La. Ct. App. 
1979) (deducing questions of fact from circumstantial evidence). 
106. See United Contractors v. United States, 368 F.2d 585, 599 (Ct. Cl. 1966).  Of
course, this does not preclude the possibility that, with future technical advances—such 
as ground tunneling radar—this question could remain permanently unknowable. 
107. John J. Wells, Inc. v. Comm’r, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 1114, 1116 (1984) (admitting 













   
  
 
     
















They refuse to decide the issue and merely allow a party’s inability to
meet its burden of proof to carry the case.  Witness as an example a federal 
court’s rejection of a libel claim by refusing to determine whether President 
Kennedy was shot from the grassy knoll108 or Justice Stephen Breyer’s
recently voiced concern about legal proclamations of truth or falsity for 
entire categories of speech such as “philosophy, religion, history, the 
social sciences, the arts, and the like.”109 
For still other jurists who must render a specific decision about the 
answer to a proposition that they consider unknowable, avoidance tactics 
are preferred.  These can include, but are not limited to, professing
agnosticism about the proposition’s truth-value,110 requiring that the
proposition’s truth-value be “proven,” “provable,” or “useful” rather than
“knowable”—although the philosophical concepts are not necessarily the 
same111—or abdicating, over vigorous dissent, a judge’s role to frame 
108. See Groden v. Random House, Inc., 94 Civ. 1074 (JSM), 1994 WL 455555, at 
*6 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 1994) (rejecting false advertising claim because the Kennedy 
assassination theory of a “grassy knoll shooter” is an improvable historical proposition, 
and thus the proposition must be left open to public interpretation under the First
Amendment), aff’d, 61 F.3d 1045 (2d Cir. 1995). 
109. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2552 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring).
An interesting question arises when Justice Breyer says, “the like.”  Whose list of “the 
like” should apply?  Is he excluding from sanction speech associated propositions he 
personally considers unanswerable?  That a majority of the public believes so?  For
which there is contest in court? Breyer offers no clues.
110. See generally PAUL HORWITZ, THE AGNOSTIC AGE: LAW, RELIGION, AND THE 
CONSTITUTION (2011) (discussing agnosticism among legal professionals in regards to 
religion); cf. Lincoln Davis Wilson, Comment, Judgmental Neutrality: When the 
Supreme Court Inevitably Implies that Your Religion Is Just Plain Wrong, 38 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 715, 747–48 (2008) (contending that the Supreme Court implicitly hinders 
the free exercise of religions purporting to be universally true and that the Court’s self-
professed “agnosticism” principle with respect to religious truth should be explicitly
abandoned). 
111. See, e.g., Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986) (requiring 
statement to be a provably false factual assertion for defamation claim to succeed); Am. 
Sch. of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty, 187 U.S. 94, 104 (1902) (holding that federal 
civil mail fraud statute does not apply to “mere matters of opinion upon subjects which
are not capable of proof as to their falsity”).  Regarding the general practice of substituting
“usefulness” as a proxy for “truth,” others have long cautioned against unintended
consequences upon understandings of truth.  Bertrand Russell wrote, 
[One’s belief that belief in God is useful to oneself] simply omits as unimportant
the question whether God really is in His heaven; if He is a useful hypothesis, 
that is enough.  God the Architect of the Cosmos is forgotten; all that is 
remembered is belief in God, and its effects upon the creatures inhabiting our
petty planet.  No wonder the Pope condemned the pragmatic defense of religion. 
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jury instructions about murky facts, claiming the role is best left to a 
prosecutor’s charging discretion and a jury’s decision.112 
Another tactic when courts sense that they may have to make a decision
about a possibly unknowable proposition’s truth-value is to evaluate the 
speaker’s sincerity, which is decidedly not the same thing. A “sincerity”
test, announced in the free exercise of religion context in United States v. 
Ballard in 1944,113 is commonly invoked for questions of religious fact.114 
However, some courts have occasionally expressed willingness to
investigate the veracity of supernatural claims.115  Note that a sincerity 
112. See Warren v. State, 835 P.2d 304, 310 (Wyo. 1992) (“The facts that justify
the jury’s verdict as to Warren arise out of a brawling fight or melee that lasted only a 
few minutes.  It would be difficult, if not impossible, to sort out and compartmentalize,
defendant by defendant and case by case, the events that occurred that night.  The State 
is entitled to have leeway in presenting the factual picture to the jury.”); id. at 313 
(Urbigkit, C.J., dissenting) (“The jury was, unfortunately, not guided [by the judge] for
its function of adjudicatory fact finding.”).  But see Traxler v. Multnomah Cnty., 596 
F.3d 1007, 1012 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Deciding what amount would compensate for the 
inability to get a job back is not a form of linear fact-finding appropriately left to the 
jury.  Just as reinstatement invokes equitable factors, so does front pay as a proxy.
Judicial discretion is at the heart of the decision.”). 
113. See 322 U.S. 78, 84 (1944). 
114. See id. at 94 (Jackson, J., dissenting). The Ballard Court justified its switch to
a sincerity test by highlighting the potential difficulty citizens could face if the
government were given unlimited authority over deciding questions of truth:
Many take their gospel from the New Testament.  But it would hardly be supposed 
that they could be tried before a jury charged with the duty of determining 
whether those teachings contained false representations.  The miracles of the
New Testament, the Divinity of Christ, life after death, the power of prayer are
deep in the religious convictions of many.  If one could be sent to jail because 
a jury in a hostile environment found those teachings false, little indeed would
be left of religious freedom. 
Id. at 87 (majority opinion). 
115. See, e.g., People ex rel. Mirsberger v. Miller, 46 N.Y.S.2d 206, 208–11 (Mag. 
Ct. 1943) (openly entertaining evidence relevant to determining the validity of 
Spiritualism’s practice of communicating with the dead); see also Chief Justice Stone’s 
dissenting remarks in Ballard: 
I cannot say that freedom of thought and worship includes freedom to procure 
money by making knowingly false statements about one’s religious experiences.
To go no further, if it were shown that a defendant in this case had asserted as 
a part of the alleged fraudulent scheme, that he had physically shaken hands 
with St. Germain in San Francisco on a day named, or that, as the indictment 
here alleges, by the exertion of his spiritual power he “had in fact cured hundreds of
persons afflicted with diseases and ailments,” I should not doubt that it would 
be open to the Government to submit to the jury proof that he had never been 
in San Francisco and that no such cures had ever been effected.
47




    
 
       
 






     
 
  
     
 
     
     
 
      
 
  






   
 
test is a generally handy means for courts to avoid taking a position on
the falsity of any similarly intricate or simply politically uncomfortable 
truth proposition.116  In some false speech cases, sincerity has begun to 
be acknowledged as a factor in the liability calculus.117 
Some judges doubt that the adversarial court process can elicit knowledge
about a proposition’s truth, even if that truth is in some manner knowable. 
Such judges are epistemological skeptics.118  Consider the words of a
Second Circuit judge—and leading defamation treatise author—who 
expresses explicit epistemological skepticism about courtroom adversarial 
testimony as a method for the identification of historical facts: 
Search for “historical fact” often stumbles in trying to reach “the truth.”  While 
somewhere in the ether there may indeed be truth—“what actually happened”—
it cannot in many instances be known with certainty. The limitations of human
perception, human memory, and human communication can make certainty as
to truth impossible, even with the best intentions.  And the best intentions are 
not always present. . . . [A]t the end of a trial in which facts are contested,
irrespective of what the trier of fact concludes, each side’s “truth” is likely to be 
diametrically opposite from what the other side is equally sure is true.  Trials 
rarely change that conviction.  Nor should they. 
322 U.S. at 89 (Stone, C.J., dissenting). 
116. Philosopher Harry Frankfurt suggests that the constant bombardment of 
Americans with various postmodern philosophies has caused “truth fatigue” among the 
citizenry.  He concludes that the disturbing, untoward result of this occurrence is that 
many citizens have become self-focused on their sincerity in representing personally
held convictions, rather than on objective inquiry into the truth of those convictions: 
The contemporary proliferation of bullshit [stems from] various forms of
skepticism which deny that we can have any reliable access to an objective 
reality, and which therefore reject the possibility of knowing how things truly
are. These “antirealist” doctrines undermine confidence in the value of disinterested 
efforts to determine what is true and what is false, and even in the intelligibility of
the notion of objective inquiry.  One response to this loss of confidence has
been a retreat from the discipline required by dedication to the ideal of correctness
to a quite different sort of discipline, which is imposed by pursuit of an alternative 
ideal of sincerity.  Rather than seeking primarily to arrive at accurate representations 
of a common world, the individual turns toward trying to provide honest
representations of himself.  Convinced that reality has no inherent nature, which 
he might hope to identify as the truth about things, he devotes himself to being 
true to his own nature. 
HARRY G. FRANKFURT, ON BULLSHIT 64–65 (2005). 
In light of Frankfurt’s comments that the citizenry has become comfortable with the 
culture substitution of the pursuit of sincerity instead of truth, one wonders to how many
other areas of growing metaphysical or epistemological controversy—besides religion—
such a sincerity test could someday extend.
117. See, e.g., FTC v. Direct Mktg. Concepts, Inc., 624 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2010) 
(“[S]incere belief may be an element in the individual liability calculus [for false speech] 
. . . .”).
118. See Michael J. Perry, Moral Knowledge, Moral Reasoning, Moral Relativism: 
A “Naturalist” Perspective, 20 GA. L. REV. 995, 1025–26 n.72 (1986) (“[E]pistemological 
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The purpose of litigation is to settle disputes, not to establish truth.119 
This doubt about the existence and objectivity of “the historical method”
in determining “historical facts” also occasionally surfaces in actual
cases in which courts must evaluate historical legal practices to inform
present-day court practice.120  Other judges, however, stake their very 
careers on the purported objectivity of such originalist historical inquiry.121 
Similarly, some courts exhibit blatant skepticism about science as a 
methodology for establishing facts,122 sometimes even concluding that
119. SACK, supra note 28, § 3.12, at 3–30; see also Stidham v. City of Whitefish,
746 P.2d 591, 598 (Mont. 1987) (Fillner, J., dissenting) (espousing same conception of 
truth as Judge Sack); Horne v. Edwards, 3 S.E.2d 1, 4 (N.C. 1939) (imitating Judge Sack’s 
conception of truth).  Sophistry is nothing new in law; Bertrand Russell once penned, 
In general, there were a large number of judges to hear each case.  The plaintiff
and defendant, or prosecutor and accused, appeared in person, not through
professional lawyers.  Naturally, success or failure depended largely on oratorical 
skill in appealing to popular prejudices.  Although a man had to deliver his own 
speech, he could hire an expert to write the speech for him, or, as many
preferred, he could pay for instruction in the arts required for success in the law 
courts.  These arts the Sophists were supposed to teach. 
RUSSELL, supra note 111, at 74–75.  Contra Triplett v. State, 132 So. 448, 450 (Miss.
1931) (“Different testimony containing the truth of gold and mixed with the dross of 
error and falsehood is carried into the crucible of the common sense minds of twelve
men selected for their intelligence, sound judgment, and fair character, and these minds 
constituting the crucible of reason often separate the refined gold from the dross.”); John 
E. Rotelle, Introduction to THE TRINITY (DE TRINITATE) 18, 18–19 (John E. Rotelle ed., 
New City Press 1991) (introducing a theory of knowledge based on analogy to other 
minds).
120. See United States v. Khan, 325 F. Supp. 2d 218, 226 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).  The court 
stated,
In his magisterial volume, Felony and Misdemeanor, Julius Goebel, Jr., has 
noted the fundamental mendacity of the historical process applied to many
forensic issues determining present rights.  He wrote:
Our profession for some seven centuries has made a cult of its historical 
method. In America, at least, this ritual has become a matter of mechanical
gesture, bereft of all piety, pervaded with pettifoggery.  For here this 
method to which jurists point with pride has been used for but mean
tasks. It is the small and immediate issues of instant litigation which 
drive the practitioner to the past in a myopic search for ruling cases and
precedents.
Id. (quoting JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., FELONY AND MISDEMEANOR: A STUDY IN THE HISTORY 
OF CRIMINAL LAW, at xxxiii (1976)). 
121. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 94, at 38 (setting out a theory of historical
interpretation).
122. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 33 Phila. 193, 251 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1996)
(“The prevalent presumption was that scientific truth or consensus were always ‘out
49





   
 
 









   
 
 













there are no scientific “facts.”123  Other courts appear more willing to take
some scientific causal propositions as settled fact.124  Still other courts
accept the possibility that multiple competing scientific methodologies may
produce admissible expert testimony.125 
Similar debates about the propriety of methodological reliability in 
acquiring factual knowledge surface in the social sciences. Without
explanation, courts sometimes state their preference for what they believe to 
be a correct general economics methodology, for example, quantitative, 
positivist predictions over explicitly recognized alternatives, such as
logico-deductive theorems.126  Some welcome the use of econometric
models in court, such as for marginal price sensitivity in antitrust
analysis.127  Others strongly caution against use of regression methods
because they believe such inferential methods cannot generally demonstrate 
there’ for the law to find and that any failure to accomplish this goal was due to
imperfections in the law’s machinery.  Social studies of science pose a fundamental
challenge to this relatively comfortable assessment.  The difficulty of locating facts, truth
or consensus now seems to be embedded in the way science works. The problem of fact
finding originates within science itself . . . .” (quoting Sheila Jasanoff, What Judges
Should Know About the Sociology of Science, 77 JUDICATURE 77, 81 (1993) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). 
123. See, e.g., In re Gadolinium-Based Contrast Agents, No. 1:08 GD 500000,
2010 WL 1796334, at *4 (N.D. Ohio May 4, 2010) (“It is unreasonable to require the 
subject of scientific testimony to be ‘known’ to a certainty, since science is an evolving 
process, and there are no certainties in science.” (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993)).  See generally Terence M. Davidson &
Christopher P. Guzelian, Evidence-Based Medicine (EBM): The (Only) Means for
Distinguishing Knowledge of Medical Causation from Expert Opinion in the Courtroom, 
47 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 741 passim (2012) (cataloguing instances of judicial
skepticism about science).
124. See, e.g., State v. Childress, 274 P.2d 333, 336 (Ariz. 1954) (“Medical science 
has established the fact that there is a rational and logical relationship between the 
percentage by weight of alcohol contained in the blood flowing through a person’s body
and that person’s state or condition of being under the influence of alcohol.  Sobriety of
an individual decreases as the percentage of alcohol in his blood increases.”).
125. See, e.g., In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 665 (3d Cir. 1999) (“The test of 
admissibility is not whether a particular scientific opinion has the best foundation, or
even whether the opinion is supported by the best methodology or unassailable research. 
Rather, the test is whether the ‘particular opinion is based on valid reasoning and reliable 
methodology.’” (quoting Kannankeril v. Terminix Int’l Inc., 128 F.3d 802, 806 (3d Cir. 
1997))), amended 199 F.3d 158 (3d Cir. 2000). 
126. See, e.g., W. Res., Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 109 F.3d 782, 790–91 (D.C.
Cir. 1997); cf. LUDWIG VON MISES, EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEMS OF ECONOMICS (George
Reisman trans., Ludwig von Mises Inst. 3d ed. 2003) (1933) (describing impropriety of 
using inferential data estimation to predict social scientific causal conclusions).
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causation.128  Some embrace courtroom admittance of mutually exclusive
regression methodologies as each being plausibly reliable in estimating a
specific social behavioral pattern, such as voter tendencies.129 
These few examples are but drops in the truth controversy bucket.
There is incalculably vast divergence in how courts decide the truth of
incalculably many propositions.
IV. CONTINUITY OF TRUTH 
A further question essential to determining the litigated falsity of a 
particular speech arises: is that speech’s falsity continuous?  Continuity— 
the correct identification of a thing or person’s immutable essence—is a
challenging philosophical matter.130  We might restate the continuity 
issue in terms relevant to false speech: Does the truth-value of any given
proposition change over time? Can we know it has changed? Do we 
know it?  By what method would we know? 
Some propositions’ discernible truths clearly do change over time, as 
any momentary truth-value is but a momentary description of an ever-
changing reality.  Truth-values for scientific propositions can be mutable.
For instance, the proposition “The universe is expanding at a decelerating 
rate” was true seven billion years ago, but today, that proposition is 
false.131  There appears to be no constant rate of expansion of the universe;
it is now an accelerating expansion.132  Dow Corning Corporation suffered 
bankruptcy because at the time of class action litigation in the 1980s and 
1990s, it appeared from the available science that the company’s silicone 
breast implants caused adverse diseases such as lupus and arthritis, but 
128. See, e.g., DeRolph v. State, 712 N.E.2d 125, 184–90 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1999) 
(rejecting expert’s attempt to use inferential regression methods to estimate relationships 
between proficiency test scoring and projected school budgets as inappropriate “junk
science”).
 129. See, e.g., Shirt v. Hazeltine, 336 F. Supp. 2d 976, 1001–04 (D.S.D. 2004) 
(endorsing reliability of various regression analyses for analyzing voter tendencies). 
130. See generally  DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (David Fate
Norton et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2000) (1740) (exploring philosophical concepts of
continuity). 
131. See Jonathan Amos, Quasars Illustrate Dark Energy’s Roller Coaster Ride, 
BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-20303592 (last updated Nov.























          
 
       
 
    









later independent scientific panels concluded—too late for Dow Corning
financially—that there was insufficient evidence for such claims.133 
But what about for other kinds of propositions besides scientific ones? 
Do moral or legal propositions’ truth-values change?  Jewish law, for 
instance, has long grappled with questions about the stasis of a legal 
inheritance right.134  Are such moral-legal truths timeless and independent
of culture,135 a claim with which some vehemently disagree?136 
Even assuming that it were known that the truth-value of a particular 
proposition had changed, it would still be potentially important to know
whether that proposition was false at the time the offending speech was 
made, yet true by the time of sanction, or vice versa.137 For this question 
of continuity, there is also legal disharmony. 
133. See Chronology of Silicone Breast Implants, FRONTLINE PBS, http://www.pbs.
org/wgbh/pages/frontline/implants/cron.html (last visited May 21, 2014).  I have on
well-trusted authority that one lead plaintiffs’ counsel in the Dow cases claimed tongue-
in-cheek to my source, “We were wrong on the science in the breast implant cases . . . 
but we’re not giving the money back.”
134. Take Jewish inheritance and property law, as discussed in the rabbinical text, 
the Gemara: 
If a son sold property of his father during his father’s lifetime and then died,
[the son’s] son may recover the property from the purchasers.  And it is this
that is difficult among the laws of jurisprudence for the purchasers ought to be
able to say to him, “Your father sold and you are recovering?”  But what is the 
difficulty?  Perhaps the grandson might say, “I come with the rights of the
father of my father as it is written, ‘In place of your fathers shall be your sons 
whom you shall make princes in all the land’” (Psalms 45:17). 
J. David Bleich, The Problem of Identity in Rashi, Rambam, and the Tosafists, TRADITION,
Summer 2008, at 24, 28 (quoting THE GEMARA, Bava Batra 159a). What is the essence 
of an inheritance right?  Should the actions of the son change the right of the grandson?
As David Bleich comments, 
It is virtually axiomatic that a person cannot transfer or devise property interests 
that are not vested in him.  If so, the son could not possibly bequest to the grandson 
property that he has already alienated. Yet the Gemara declares that the grandson’s
claim to recover the alienated property presents no doctrinal difficulty because 
property passes directly from the grandfather to the grandson by operation of 
the law of inheritance thereby obviating any property interest that might have been
asserted in the name of the son.
Id. at 29 (footnote omitted). 
135. “For truly I tell you, until heaven and earth pass away, not one letter, not one 
stroke of a letter, will pass from the law until all is accomplished.”  Matthew 5:18. 
136. See Alison Dundes Renteln, Relativism and the Search for Human Rights, 90
AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 56, 61 (1988) (asserting that “there are or there can be no value 
judgments that are true, that is, objectively justifiable, independent of specific cultures” 
(quoting Paul F. Schmidt, Some Criticisms of Cultural Relativism, 52 J. PHIL. 780, 782
(1955)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Courts differ, for instance, whether to award prior restraints against 
defamatory speech that is currently false but might in the future become
true.138  Or consider a First Circuit decision overruling a lower federal
district court that permitted a religious nonprofit corporation to avoid 
SEC reporting regulations.139  The corporation contended that a religious
entity may report aspirational revenues as current assets.140 Accused of 
fraudulent accounting, the corporation explained that its prospectus’s
intended audience was religious.141  Thus, the corporation reasoned, the
audience had or should have had a different understanding than a secular
audience about what financially will become true—and thus is presently
true—as a result of prayer.142  The court did not accept this rationale, 
proclaiming that the prospectus was merely aspirational, not true, and 
the revenues had not yet come to pass at the time the prospectus was
distributed.143 
Ultimately, questions of continuity can be made as difficult to resolve, 
if not more so, than questions about the momentary truth of a proposition.
V. DELIMITERS: DEFINING SANCTIONS FOR FALSE SPEECH
A major source of disagreements surfacing in false speech cases is the
question of sanction: How do we decide whether to punish a particular 
speech agreed and known to be false?
Every speech is a unique historical event. No two speeches are the 
same; there are contextual differences in the audience, or audiences, the
speaker, or speakers, the speech content, the length, the delivery of the
speech—tonal quality, volume, stage props, graphics, et cetera—the
audience’s perception, or perceptions, of the speech, the audience’s reliance 
upon the speech, rebuttal, or rebuttals, of the speech, recorded repetition 
of the speech, the place, or places, the time, the moment in history, et
cetera ad infinitum. 
138. Compare id. (rejecting on balance the concept of prior restraint on defamatory
speech, in part for fear that it may muzzle false propositions that at a later point become
true), with Balboa Island Vill. Inn, Inc. v. Lemen, 156 P.3d 339, 353 (Cal. 2007) (permitting 
narrowly tailored prior restraint on defamation, in which a defendant may seek to have 
the restraint modified if an adjudged false speech later becomes true).
139. See SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 537, 543 (1st Cir. 1976).
140.  See id. at 540. 
141.  Id. at 538. 
142.  See id. at 538–40. 







   
 
 
   
    











      







Consequently, one might be tempted to say that proper determination 
of whether to sanction a particular false speech would have to take into 
account the universal context, all of the innumerable historical elements 
of that speech, and each element’s legal relevance.  Such a holistic approach 
would imply that there could be no interspeech comparisons in rendering 
judgment, nor would there be any such thing as precedent—judges 
would be perfectly free to decide each case as it came up.  Each confronted 
speech would have to be scrutinized and judged on its own atomistic,
individual merits. 
Some judges think law should be holistic.144  Without weighing in on
either the possibility or propriety of this contention, we can observe that
American judges do not generally act like holists.  If we look at how law 
is practiced, courts articulate “categories” of supposedly similar speeches.145 
Certain categories of like speech content are not generally sanctioned— 
political speech—although others are—obscenity, incitement to violence,
threats, fighting words, et cetera.146  Courts then classify individual historical
instances of speech as members or nonmembers of these various categories
144. See JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 
170 (1950).
145. “Categories” are also called “ideal types” by Max Weber and Ludwig von
Mises. See LUDWIG VON MISES, HUMAN ACTION: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 59–60 (Fox
& Wilkes 4th rev. ed. 1996) (1949); MAX WEBER, “Objectivity” in Social Science and 
Social Policy, in  THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 49, 89–90 (Edward A. 
Shils & Henry A. Finch eds. & trans., 1949).  Categories, or ideal types, are used all the 
time and not just in the context of First Amendment cases or law. See, e.g., MISES, supra, at
60. An example might be the sociologist’s category “dictator,” in which we might place
“Hitler,” “Stalin,” “Idi Amin,” “Pol Pot,” and such, although others, in the Middle East
for example, might place most American presidents but leave out the Ayatollah Khomeini. 
146. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 457 
(2007) (“[T]he First Amendment requires us to err on the side of protecting political
speech rather than suppressing it.”); Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Suspicious of Ohio
Law that Criminalizes False Speech About Candidates, WASH. POST (Apr. 22, 2014)
(noting that Supreme Court Justices expressed concerns about an Ohio statute that makes 
it a crime to “post, publish, circulate, distribute, or otherwise disseminate a false
statement concerning a candidate, either knowing the same to be false or with reckless 
disregard for whether it was false or not, if the statement is designed to promote the election,
nomination, or defeat of the candidate”) (internal quotation marks omitted), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/politics/supreme-court-suspicious-of-ohio-law-that-criminalizes-false-
speech-about-candidates/2014/04/22/bced8fb4-ca5c-11e3-93eb-6c0037d de2ad_story.html;
cf. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003) (finding that words that incite violence 
lack constitutional protection); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971) (finding that
fighting words do not merit constitutional protection); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S.
705, 708 (1969) (finding that constitutional protection does not extend to threats); Roth 
v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding obscenity not constitutionally protected). 
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by selective reference to what they consider to be the relevant—but
inescapably incomplete—historical facts.147 
Observe that a category of speech content is merely a word or phrase:
“obscenity,” “incitement” and “true threats.”  But these words are legally
potent. If one’s speech is incitement, it can be punished if the sanctioning 
law survives rational basis review.148  So too if the speech is defamation 
or obscenity.149  If the particular instance of speech is instead identified 
as commercial speech, political speech, artistic speech, or parody, it is 
generally more immune from sanction.150 
A burning question then is this: is “false speech” a category of 
sanctionable, unprotected speech according to the First Amendment? 
Some judges and philosophers consider false speech under nearly any
conditions to be immoral and appropriately subject to possible sanction— 
presumably at a legislature’s discretion.151  Others, such as Ninth Circuit
Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, adopt a far more tolerant approach, suggesting
147. Cf. United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2555 (2012) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (“[F]ew statutes, if any, simply prohibit without limitation the telling of a lie, 
even a lie about one particular matter.  Instead, in virtually all these instances limitations of 
context, requirements of proof of injury, and the like, narrow the statute to a subset of 
lies where specific harm is more likely to occur. The limitations help to make certain that the
statute does not allow its threat of liability or criminal punishment to roam at large,
discouraging or forbidding the telling of the lie in contexts where harm is unlikely or the 
need for the prohibition is small.”).
148. But see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–84 (1992) (noting that 
under some circumstances, unprotected categories of speech content are subject to heightened
scrutiny).
149. See id.
150. See, e.g., Fed. Election Comm’n, 551 U.S. at 457 (finding political speech
constitutionally protected); Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) 
(finding that First Amendment did not extend to parody in certain circumstances); Bolger
v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 64–65 (1983) (noting that commercial speech 
possesses constitutional protection); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973) (noting
that artistic speech has constitutional protection).
151. See, e.g., Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2557 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“[T]he right to free 
speech does not protect false factual statements that inflict real harm and serve no 
legitimate interest.”); United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1228 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(Bybee, J., dissenting) (“[T]he spheres of protection carved out in New York Times, Hustler, 
and like cases represent limited exceptions to the general rule that false statements of fact 
are not protected by the First Amendment . . . . If a false statement of fact does not fall
within one of these exceptions, it falls within the general historically unprotected
category of [false] speech . . . .” (citation omitted)), aff’d, 132 S. Ct. 2537; SISSELA BOK, 
LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE, at xxxiii–xxxiv (1999) (contending 





























      
    
 
that the commonness of lying in most citizens’ daily lives necessitates a 
constitutional safe harbor for most false speech.152  Thus, just as we have
seen vastly different human perspectives on truth and identification of 
false speech, so too are there wide differences in opinion whether false
speech is immoral, the extent to which that morality should be reflected 
in secular legal sanctions, and speaking specifically about the American
experience, the extent to which moral considerations should influence 
First Amendment jurisprudence.153 
Recently false speech cases have wound their way through the highest 
levels of American federal courts in federal circuit cases United States v. 
Alvarez154 and United States v. Strandlof 155 and the 2012 Supreme Court
case United States v. Alvarez.156  Splits between the federal circuit decisions
demonstrated that it was unclear whether false speech is a sanctionable
speech category, or whether only traditionally sanctionable subcategories of
false speech—fraud, defamation, perjury, and false commercial speech— 
152.  Kozinski writes with characteristic comedy, 
Saints may always tell the truth, but for mortals living means lying.  We lie
to protect our privacy (“No, I don’t live around here”); to avoid hurt feelings 
(“Friday is my study night”); to make others feel better (“Gee you’ve gotten
skinny”); to avoid recriminations (“I only lost $10 at poker”); to prevent grief
(“The doc says you’re getting better”); to maintain domestic tranquility (“She’s 
just a friend”); to avoid social stigma (“I just haven’t met the right woman”); 
for career advancement (“I’m sooo lucky to have a smart boss like you”); to 
avoid being lonely (“I love opera”); to eliminate a rival (“He has a boyfriend”);
to achieve an objective (“But I love you so much”); to defeat an objective 
(“I’m allergic to latex”); to make an exit (“It’s not you, it’s me”); to delay the
inevitable (“The check is in the mail”); to communicate displeasure (“There’s
nothing wrong”); to get someone off your back (“I’ll call you about lunch”); to 
escape a nudnik (“My mother’s on the other line”); to namedrop (“We go way
back”); to set up a surprise party (“I need help moving the piano”); to buy time 
(“I’m on my way”); to keep up appearances (“We’re not talking divorce”); to 
avoid taking out the trash (“My back hurts”); to duck an obligation (“I’ve got a
headache”); to maintain a public image (“I go to church every Sunday”); to
make a point (“Ich bin ein Berliner”); to save face (“I had too much to drink”);
to humor (“Correct as usual, King Friday”); to avoid embarrassment (“That
wasn’t me”); to curry favor (“I’ve read all your books”); to get a clerkship 
(“You’re the greatest living jurist”); to save a dollar (“I gave at the office”); or
to maintain innocence (“There are eight tiny reindeer on the rooftop”).
United States v. Alvarez, 638 F.3d 666, 674–75 (9th Cir. 2011) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring in
the denial of rehearing en banc).
153. Compare Murray N. Rothbard, Law, Property Rights, and Air Pollution, 2 
CATO J. 55, 62 (1982) (rejecting sanctions of false speech even for defamation), with
Jonathan Garret Erwin, Note, Can Deterrence Play a Positive Role in Defamation Law?, 
19 REV. LITIG. 675, 684 (2000) (noting plaintiffs may recover for defamation claims). 
154.  617 F.3d at 1198. 
155. 667 F.3d 1146 (10th Cir. 2012), abrogated by Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2537, and
vacated, 684 F.3d 962 (10th Cir. 2012).
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are sanctionable. A plurality of the Justices in United States v. Alvarez
appeared to indicate, without entirely excluding the possibility of future 
exceptions, that false speech is not a sanctionable category of speech just 
by virtue of a speech’s falsity and that only traditionally unprotected
subcategories are.157  The question of sanctions for false speech therefore 
might appear to the Supreme Court Justices’ trained eyes and ears to be
resolved, albeit—and importantly—without binding effect.  Unfortunately,
it is not. 
Let us first be clear what one problem is that the Court did not even try
to resolve in Alvarez. It is one thing to make an abstract proclamation that
only “traditionally punishable false speech” will be left unprotected.158 
It is something far more daunting to faithfully apply that legal rule to
render consistent and predictable verdicts when exonerating or punishing 
specific speeches.  Sociologists Max Weber and Ludwig von Mises 
famously suggested that classifying a historical instance of speech by
category is the work of a skilled historian using historical judgment.159 Per
Mises, however, there will therefore be unavoidable discrepancy between
historians in their judgment whether to classify a particular speech as
sanctioned or protected because historians value the comparative relevance
of various historical facts differently.160  For instance, one court might 
157. See id. at 2545 (“[T]he Court has been careful to instruct that falsity alone 
may not suffice to bring the speech outside the First Amendment.”). 
158. Bear in mind that this proposition continues to be disputed among judges, 
even at the Supreme Court in Alvarez. See id. at 2544; id. at 2551, 2553–54 (Breyer, J., 
concurring); id. at 2562 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
159. Mises called such judgment “understanding” or “Verstehen.” See  MISES, supra
note 145, at 50–51. 
160. Mises cites four possible causes of inconsistencies in historical conclusions. 
See id. at 52–58. He also cites a few other trivial sources of inconsistency not worth
reproducing here.  To paraphrase him, 
1. “[T]he intentional distortion of facts by propagandists and apologists 
parading as historians.” Id. at 52 (emphasis added). Obviously such 
individuals would be inappropriate judges. 
2. Differing access to or researching of historical facts or source material. 
Id. at 55. Mises implies that such discrepancies can be rectified by extensive 
research and sharing of all available information related to the historical
occurrence between historians.  See id. at 52, 55, 57–58.  He stresses that 
this sort of disagreement has to do only with differences in the amount
and quality of data considered. See id. The adversarial courtroom process, 
coupled with the rules of evidence, are theoretically equipped to ensure that 





   
 
 
   
 




   
   
 




    












   
 
 
   
  
3. Differential quality or approaches in the historian’s application of 
nonhistorical branches of science or investigation. See id. at 52–53. 
Mises concludes, 
Only those who believe that facts write their own story into the
tabula rasa of the human mind blame the historians for such
differences of opinion. They fail to realize that history can never
be studied without presuppositions, and that dissension with regard
to the presuppositions, i.e., the whole content of the nonhistorical
branches of knowledge, must determine the establishment of
historical facts.
These presuppositions also determine the historian’s decision 
concerning the choice of facts to be mentioned and those to be 
omitted as irrelevant.  In searching for the causes of a cow’s not
giving milk a modern veterinarian will disregard entirely all reports 
concerning a witch’s evil eye; his view would have been different 
three hundred years ago.  In the same way the historian selects from
the indefinite multitude of events that preceded the fact he is dealing 
with those which could have contributed to its emergence—or have
delayed it—and neglects those which, according to his grasp of the 
nonhistorical [branches of knowledge], could not have influenced it.
Changes in the teachings of the nonhistorical [branches of 
knowledge] consequently must involve a rewriting of history. 
Id. at 53 (emphasis added). 
4. Even if the other above factors can be harmonized between historians, 
there is an unavoidably subjective and personal element of understanding. 
See id. at 57–58. Mises writes, 
[T]here necessarily enters into understanding an element of
subjectivity. . . . Two historians . . . . [M]ay fully agree in 
establishing that the factors a, b, and c worked together in
producing the effect P; nonetheless they can widely disagree with
regard to the relevance of the respective contributions of a, b, and 
c to the final outcome. . . . Of course, these are not judgments of
value, they do not express preferences of the historian.  They are 
judgments of relevance.  Historians may disagree for various reasons. 
They may hold different views with regard to the teachings of the 
nonhistorical sciences; they may base their reasoning on a more 
or less complete familiarity with the records; they may differ in 
the understanding of the motives and aims of the acting men and 
of the means applied by them.  All these differences are open to a 
settlement by “objective” reasoning; it is possible to reach a universal
agreement with regard to them.  But as far as historians disagree
with regard to judgments of relevance it is impossible to find a 
solution which all sane men must accept.
Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).  Mises’s extensive, searching evaluation concludes
that (1) reliable historical “categorizations” of events are possible to form and (2) reliable 
classification of individual historical events, including instances of speech, as belonging—or
not belonging—to a given category is possible through understanding, but (3) there will
always remain an irremovable element of subjectivity in any historical investigation and
ontological categorization, not based on personal values or ethics but on disagreements 




     
      
 
     
























[VOL. 51:  19, 2014] False Speech: Quagmire? 
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
decide that a false article printed in a tabloid damaged someone’s 
reputation—injury being a necessary aspect or delimiter of defamation— 
whereas the same article printed in a newspaper did not; another court
might find the reverse.161 The difference in judgment could stem from
differing emphases on historical facts.  Perhaps one court found it more
revealing what subsequent letters to the editor in the newspaper stated
about the allegedly defamed party.  Perhaps another chose instead to give
more weight to blogger comments in the local region by self-identifying
newspaper and tabloid readers. 
Then there is an additional problem of taxonomy for sanctions. The
fact that there is such disparity amongst judges in identifying examples 
of sanctionable false speech—or traditionally punishable false speech, as 
the Alvarez plurality preferred—is not a comforting result, particularly in 
law where language has consequences.  Indeed, as Ludwig Wittgenstein 
once penned,
If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not 
only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments.  This seems to
abolish logic, but does not do so.  It is one thing to describe methods of
measurement, and another to obtain and state results of measurement.  But what 
we call “measuring” is partly determined by a certain constancy in results of 
measurement.162 
Following Wittgenstein’s call for consistency in judgment, and Weber’s
and Mises’s recognition that historical judgment is in part unavoidably
subjective,163 the obvious first step in improving uniformity in judgment
about when to sanction false speech is to name those subattributes of 
false speech—gleaned from the infinite context of each particular allegedly 
false speech case—that are legally meaningful to, and appropriate for,
making the speech sanctionable.164  I call such legally relevant labels
   Mises states that it is improper for a historian, at the historical stage of inquiry, to
normatively justify or condemn historical speeches or ontological historical categories. 
See id. at 52. For instance, one may personally hate nonmaterial lies, but that personally
held moral worldview should not affect one’s classification of a given instance of allegedly
false speech as constitutionally protected or unprotected if materiality is, in fact, a delimiter of
sanctionable false speech.
161. See McDermott v. Biddle, 674 A.2d 665, 666–67 (Pa. 1996). 
162. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 75 (G. E. M. Anscombe 
trans., 3d ed. 2001). 
163. See supra text accompanying notes 145, 160. 

















    
    









   









“delimiters.”  Delimiters offer current litigants and future speakers a refined 
description of whether their allegedly false speech is sanctionable.
Without clear delimiters, we revert to a holistic each-case-judged-on-its-
unique-merits approach that will present a sizeable challenge to any
speaker in predicting potential sanctions prior to speaking.165 
The aspect from which history arranges and assorts the infinite multiplicity
of events is their meaning. . . . [A historical category] cannot be defined; it 
must be characterized by an enumeration of those features whose presence by
and large decides whether in a concrete instance we are or are not faced with a 
specimen belonging to the [historical category] in question.  It is peculiar to the 
[historical category] that not all its characteristics need to be present in any one
example.  Whether or not the absence of some characteristics prevents the
inclusion of a concrete specimen in the [historical category] in question, 
depends on a relevance judgment by understanding. . . . 
. . . .
 No historical problem can be treated without the aid of [historical categories]. 
Even when the historian deals with an individual person or with a single event, 
he cannot avoid referring to [historical categorization].  If he speaks of
Napoleon, he must refer to such [historical categories] as commander, dictator, 
revolutionary leader; and if he deals with the French Revolution he must refer
to [historical categories] such as revolution, disintegration of an established 
regime, anarchy. . . . 
. . . .
Whether the use of a definite [historical category] is to be recommended or 
not depends entirely on the mode of understanding.  [Consider two historical
categories]: Left-Wing Parties (Progressives) and Right-Wing Parties (Fascists).
The former includes the Western democracies, some Latin American dictatorships,
and Russian Bolshevism; the latter Italian Fascism and German Nazism.  This
typification is the outcome of a definite mode of understanding.  Another mode
would contrast Democracy and Dictatorship. Then Russian Bolshevism, Italian 
Fascism, and German Nazism belong to the [historical category] of dictatorial 
government, and the Western systems to the [historical category] of democratic
government. 
. . . .
[The historical category] is always the representation of complex phenomena 
of reality . . . . 
MISES, supra note 145, at 59–62. 
Max Weber and Ludwig von Mises called historical categories “ideal types,” but the 
concept is the same.  See id.
165. It is sometimes said that courts must maintain a “flexible” approach to First 
Amendment cases and avoid delimiters because the First Amendment accommodates
different values.  See Book Note, Romancing the First Amendment, 104 HARV. L. REV. 
955, 956 (1991) (reviewing STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, 
AND ROMANCE (1990)) (“[T]he first amendment cannot be reduced to a single principle 
because ‘first amendment values conflict in complicated ways with numerous other 
values in complicated contexts.’ . . . [F]irst amendment methodology should permit
openness and diversity and thus promote a Romantic emphasis on passion, iconoclasm, 
and flexibility. . . . [C]ase-by-case balancing ‘emphasizes that first amendment decisions
are not mere analytic puzzles.’” (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted) (quoting SHIFFRIN, 
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This Article has already extensively discussed one delimiter: falsity.166 
A speech must obviously be false to be sanctionable false speech. We have
already seen many snares in judging falsity consistently and accurately.167 
And only time will tell whether the Alvarez plurality’s determination that
the additional delimiter, “traditional falsehoods”—fraud, defamation,
perjury, false advertising—is required for sanction ends up as binding
precedent.168  But there are many other delimiters besides falsity and 
tradition that courts occasionally or often consider necessary to sanction 
an instance of false speech: “intentionality,” “materiality,” “injuriousness,” 
et cetera.169 
This thinking concludes that there cannot be just one way to fulfill a delimiter, even for 
contextually similar speeches. See Book Note, supra, at 956. If true, this renders a
delimiting approach to First Amendment controversies useless.  It is unclear what the
substitute would be.  It should also not escape us that malintentioned arbiters could use 
this view as a cover for unacceptably subjective, ad hoc decisions about a particular false 
speech’s constitutionality.  By this reasoning, judges could demand a negligence mens 
rea for some instances of false speech, but in other cases, even if the arbiter agrees that
the speeches are contextually similar, the arbiter may prefer—inexplicably—to require
actual malice mens rea.
 166. See supra text accompanying notes 44–54. 
167. See supra text accompanying notes 44–54. 
168. If it does, assuredly the challenge in every false speech case will become to 
identify better the extremely fuzzy boundaries of what is, and what is not, “traditional” false 
speech. See Guzelian, supra note 44, at 678–79 (describing that even for the supposedly
robustly defined category of defamation, it is highly unclear what constitutes, and what 
does not constitute, defamation).
169. Researching false speech cases provides a number of factors that courts 
sometimes—but emphatically not always—believe to be necessary considerations in
deciding whether to sanction a false speech:
1. Must falsity be provable for this false speech to be unprotected? See, e.g., 
Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 778 (1986) (“[R]equiring
the plaintiff to show falsity will insulate from liability some speech that is
false, but unprovably so.”). 
2. What mental state, mens rea, is necessary or sufficient with respect to
falsity for this false speech to be unprotected? See, e.g., United States v. 
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2553 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring) (“[T]he 
Court emphasizes mens rea requirements that provide ‘breathing room’
for more valuable speech by reducing an honest speaker’s fear that he 
may accidentally incur liability speaking.”). 
3. Must this false speech be materially false to be unprotected? See, e.g., id. 
at 2554; United States v. Hamilton, 699 F.3d 356, 362 (4th Cir. 2012)
(requiring government to prove a statement is “material to a matter within
the jurisdiction of [an] agency” to obtain a conviction for a false statement 





   
 
 
    
  















   
  
 
Problematically, however, judges are inconsistent and contradictory in
determining which additional delimiters besides mere falsity are generally 
necessary for sanction of a particular false speech.170  The fact that only 
a plurality of Justices in Alvarez could muster support for a blanket 
delimiter of traditional falsehoods is evidence of this general difficulty to 
form consensus.171  Moreover, similar difficulties to those we saw for
4. Must this false speech cause injurious reliance to be unprotected? See, 
e.g., United States v. Kepler, 879 F. Supp. 2d 1006, 1009 n.1 (S.D. Iowa
2011) (noting that proof of detrimental reliance or actual harm to the 
plaintiff is an essential element of a false speech claim).
5. What kinds of injuries caused by this false speech are legally recognizable? 
See, e.g., Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2555 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
6. Is there a legally valid justification or excuse for this false speech that 
exempts it from otherwise clear sanction? See United States v. Alvarez, 
638 F.3d 666, 674 (9th Cir. 2011) (Kozinski, C.J., concurring in the 
denial of rehearing en banc). 
7. Is this false speech of a type that simply cannot be punished under any 
circumstances? See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447, 449
(1969) (per curiam) (striking down statute that criminally punished
advocacy of violence). 
8. Would a prior restraint on this false speech ever be allowed? See, e.g., 
Carroll v. President & Comm’rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180–81 
(1968) (“[N]oncriminal process of prior restraints upon expression
‘avoids constitutional infirmity only if it takes place under procedural 
safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship system.’”
(quoting Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965))). 
9. Is the sanction being sought for this false speech constitutional? See, e.g., 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828–29 
(1995) (“[T]he government offends the First Amendment when it imposes
financial burdens on certain speakers based on the content of their 
expression.” (citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State 
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115 (1991))). 
10. Who decides these standards: an agency, legislature, judge, jury, more
than one of these, or none of these? See, e.g., Miller v. United States, 413 
U.S. 15, 25 (1973) (noting that the states regulate obscene materials, not
the courts; however, courts may suggest what the legislature could define
as obscene). 
11. Who carries the burden of proof in arguing these standards: the plaintiff,
prosecutor, or defendant? See, e.g., Hepps, 475 U.S. at 777 (holding that 
private-figure plaintiff bore burden of demonstrating speech was false
before plaintiff could recover damages under defamation claim).
There may be other general standards that courts have considered that are inadvertently
omitted from this list.  Note also that these standards are interdependent; it is not 
sufficient to simply consider one of them—such as number 11, the burden of proof— 
without also considering the others for a given instance of false speech.  See id. at 777– 
78 (noting that shifting burden of proving falsity would protect false, unprovable 
statements).
170. See, e.g., Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544 (plurality opinion); id. at 2551, 2553–54 
(Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 2562 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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falsity arise for other delimiters used to establish contours of false speech 
sanctions. Courts suffer to evaluate whether a particular delimiter that 
they deem necessary for sanction is fulfilled by a particular false speech.
Let us turn to a case study of but one possible delimiter—materiality—to 
evidence this. 
A. Case Study of Materiality as a Delimiter for Sanction: The SVA
“[A] more finely tailored statute . . . . [Than the SVA] might, as
other kinds of statutes prohibiting false factual statements have 
done, insist upon a showing that the false statement caused
specific harm or at least was material . . . .”172 
—Justice Stephen Breyer
The original SVA declared as criminal false representations about 
receiving military honors.173 Nowhere did it discuss whether the false
representation must be material.174  For that matter, the SVA was 
facially silent about any requirements for sanction other than statutorily 
undefined falsity and the topic of the speech—receipt of military
honors.175  The enactment of this minimalist criminal statute lacking 
explicit delimiters against a blurry backdrop of conflicting judicial
beliefs about truth versus falsity, and as we shall now see, materiality 
versus immateriality, seemed to suggest it was the accused’s luck of the
judicial draw whether speech—potentially even true speech—about a
legislatively prioritized topic could be punished by jail time.  The Ninth
Circuit Alvarez majority sensed this problem with the SVA when it 
spoke about the need to consider the “context” of a lie before penalizing
it, yet it did not elaborate further.176 
Let us assume, as Justice Breyer did, that given poor congressional
draftsmanship, judges should ride to the statutory rescue by “reading in” 
a materiality requirement for the SVA.177  I shall now present evidence
of the historical absence of principled, consistent judicial application of 
172. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2537 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
173.  18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2006). 
174. See id.
 175. See id.
176. United States v. Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1200 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d, 132 S. 
Ct. 2537 (2012) (plurality opinion).  So did Justice Breyer in his Alvarez concurrence. 
132 S. Ct. at 2555 (Breyer, J., concurring). 

























     
   
 




   
  
  
   
  
the materiality delimiter in false speech cases, even for contextually 
similar speeches.  I will not prove it in this Article for sake of brevity, 
but my intuition is that the same kinds of difficulties exist for most, if 
not all, of the general or specific delimiters that are commonly required 
or proposed as applicable First Amendment preconditions to sanctioning
false speech.178 
With few exceptions, there is no readily apparent way to determine 
why some false speech must be materially false to be punished under the 
First Amendment, while other false speech need not be.  Nor is there a
“one size fits all” definition of materiality. Nor is there any apparent 
way to anticipate which definition a court will apply if it deems that a 
materiality delimiter is merited for a given instance of false speech.
The Supreme Court for some statutory penalizations of false speech
has defined materiality to mean “‘ha[ving] a natural tendency to influence, 
or [being] capable of influencing, the decision of’ the decisionmaking 
body to which it was addressed.”179  Courts have applied this definition
178. For some false speech, in addition to general delimiters relevant to sanction
such as those given supra note 169, courts sometimes create special subcategory-specific
or speech-specific delimiters.  For example, courts have fashioned constitutionally mandatory
delimiters specific to defamation, such as
(1) Was the speech about a public or a private figure?
(2) Was the speech about a matter of public concern?
(3) Was the speaker a member of the media?
(4) Is the speaker seeking actual or punitive damages? 
See, e.g., Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986); Gertz v. Roberts
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 396 (1974) (White, J., dissenting). 
The risk of allowing the invocation of unique delimiters for certain kinds of false 
speech in addition to general delimiters is that it could offer a ruse for judges to create
arbitrary delimiters with the excuse that a certain speech’s unique context requires them.
See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 396. Justice White objected to perceived ad hoc lawmaking by
the Supreme Court in the establishment of constitutional defamation delimiters: 
With a flourish of the pen, the Court . . . discards the prevailing rule in libel
and slander actions that punitive damages may be awarded on the classic grounds
of common-law malice, that is, “‘actual malice’ in the sense of ill will or fraud
or reckless indifference to consequences.” In its stead, the Court requires 
defamation plaintiffs to show intentional falsehood or reckless disregard for the 
truth or falsity of the publication. . . . 
. . . .
For almost 200 years, punitive damages and the First Amendment have peacefully
coexisted.  There has been no demonstration that state libel laws as they relate
to punitive damages necessitate the majority’s extreme response.  I fear that those
who read the Court’s decision will find its words inaudible, for the Court speaks 
“only with a voice of power, not of reason.” 
Gertz, 418 U.S. at 395–96, 398 (citations omitted) (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
686 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF 
DAMAGES § 118, at 431 (1935). 
179. Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988) (quoting Weinstock v. United 
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in perjury proceedings,180 False Claims Act violations,181 18 U.S.C. § 1001 
violations—false statements about any matter within the jurisdiction of
the federal government,182 et cetera.
In other instances, such as for federal mail fraud,183 bank fraud,184 and 
wire fraud,185 the Supreme Court has invoked a different definition of
materiality: that stated in the Second Restatement of Torts.186  For other
statutes that restrict materially false speech, the Supreme Court has not 
yet opined what definition of materiality should apply.  For example, the 
Supreme Court has declined to state whether the definition of material
used in denaturalization proceedings187 also applies to false statements
made in the context of visa procurements.188 
Supreme Court decisions sometimes distinguish materiality—defined 
as the possibility that the false speech could cause injury—from reliance— 
whether the false speech did have an injurious effect.189  Yet remedies  
professor Emily Sherwin contends that in the context of fraud, materiality
means something quite different.  She states, “[T]he most straightforward 
reading of the materiality requirement is that some fraudulent 
misrepresentations, even if deliberate, believed, believable, and acted on 
in fact, should not have legal consequences. In other words, materiality 
180. See, e.g., United States v. Hasan, 609 F.3d 1121, 1137 (10th Cir. 2010). 
181. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(b)(4) (2012) (“[T]he term ‘material’ means having a 
natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of 
money or property.”). 
182.  See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 612 F.3d 698, 701 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
183.  18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012). 
184. Id. § 1344. 
185. Id. § 1343. 
186. See, e.g., Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22 n.5 (1999) (noting that the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts defines materiality as “(a) a reasonable man would attach 
importance to its existence or nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the 
transaction in question,” or “(b) the maker of the representation knows or has reason to
know that its recipient regards or is likely to regard the matter as important in determining his
choice of action, although a reasonable man would not so regard it” (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
187.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (2012). 
188. See id. § 1182; see also Monter v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 546, 555 n.12 (2d Cir. 
2005) (describing this ambiguity). 
189. See, e.g., United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 501 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
















    








    
  
  
is a de minimus limitation, marking off a zone in which proven fraud is 
tolerated by law.”190 
In some contexts, such as Rule 10(b)(5) securities fraud, the Supreme 
Court and other courts appear to adhere more closely to Sherwin’s 
definition of materiality than its typical definition that distinguishes 
materiality and reliance.191  Yet other courts have expressly rejected
Sherwin’s “de minimus” definition of materiality, at least for a perjury
inquiry.  For instance, the Federal Ninth Circuit has stated that a material 
perjury need only be “relevant to any subsidiary issue under consideration,”
and “[t]he government need not prove that the perjured testimony 
actually influenced the relevant decision-making body.”192  Another
federal court, in a willful bank misapplication case, invoked an “intent to 
mislead” materiality test and explicitly rejected a reliance test of 
materiality.193 
Many federal statutes punishing false speech expressly include a 
requirement of materiality.194  Many others, however, do not.195  Only in 
1997 did the Supreme Court first attempt to impose some order on this 
statutory chaos by creating a bright line rule: Congressional criminal
statutes penalizing “misrepresentations” or “false representations”
henceforth would be interpreted to include a materiality delimiter, even
if the statute did not explicitly require such.  In contrast, statutes that
restricted the use of “false statements” would be interpreted not to
include a materiality delimiter unless the statute expressly provided
196one. 
190. Emily Sherwin, Nonmaterial Misrepresentation: Damages, Rescission, and
the Possibility of Efficient Fraud, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1017, 1021 (2003) (emphasis
added).
191. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32 (1988) (“[T]here must be a 
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by
the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information 
made available.” (emphasis added) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 
438, 449 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 
635 F.2d 156, 166 (2d Cir. 1980) (defining materiality, in the securities fraud context, as
“reasonably certain to have a substantial effect on the market price of the security”
(emphasis added) (quoting SEC v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 15 (1977)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
192. United States v. McKenna, 327 F.3d 830, 839 (9th Cir. 2003) (emphasis 
added) (quoting United States v. Lococo, 450 F.2d 1196, 1199 (9th Cir. 1971)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
193. See United States v. Kernodle, 367 F. Supp. 844, 852 (M.D.N.C. 1973). 
194. For instance, see 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2012); 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (2012); 18
U.S.C. § 1623(a) (2012). 
195. See 18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2012) (lacking materiality requirement). 
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Justice Stevens—and at the circuit level, Judge Alex Kozinski— 
vehemently dissented in United States v. Wells, arguing that there was no
distinction at common law between false statements, false representations,
or misrepresentations and that the Court was creating an arbitrary,
artificial, implicit standard.197 Even assuming there were differing common 
law origins of false statements and misrepresentations, we should 
constitutionally wonder why Congress can require some false speech to
be materially false to be sanctioned, although it can—ostensibly as a 
matter of political will—decline to require other sanctioned false speech
to be the same. 
In other words, the implication of Wells is that, much like a legislatively 
defined falsehood,198 the political process—not the First Amendment— 
will dictate whether a speaker’s false speech has to be materially false to
be punished. Moreover, Wells and its progeny offer no insight into how
courts will interpret statutes that penalize false speech that is statutorily
described with words other than false statements or misrepresentations— 
such as false marking;199 false data or information;200 or false reports or
information.201 
State courts have done little better in adequately defining what is 
meant by materiality or explaining to which forms of false speech such a
requirement should apply.202  California offers yet another definition of
materiality: “whether the statement or testimony ‘might have been used 
to affect the proceeding in or for which it was made.’”203  Texas common 
law fraud demands a subjective inquiry into materiality—whether the 
speaker believed the speaker’s false speech to be material.204  In Kansas, 
the inquiry is an objective one—whether a reasonable person could believe
the false speech to be material.205  In common law tort, if damages are
197. See id. at 504 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S.
759[, 769] (1988) . . . made it perfectly clear that ‘false statements’ share a common-law 
ancestry with ‘misrepresentations.’”).
198.  See supra p. 16 (discussing legislatively defined falsity). 
199.  35 U.S.C. § 292 (2006). 
200.  42 U.S.C. § 17302 (2006). 
201.  12 U.S.C. § 164 (2012). 
202. See, e.g., United States v. Philip Morris USA Inc., 566 F.3d 1095, 1122 (D.C.
Cir. 2009); Koch v. Koch Indus., 203 F.3d 1202, 1230–33 (10th Cir. 2000); People v.
Kobrin, 903 P.2d 1027, 1028 (Cal. 1995). 
203. Kobrin, 903 P.2d at 1028 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 123 (West 1995)).
204. Koch, 203 F.3d at 1232. 
205. See Philip Morris, 566 F.3d at 1122 (requiring reasonable person test of 
materially false speech for mail or wire fraud).
67





    













   
 
 







   
   
 
sought for false speech, there is an implied requirement of materiality.206 
However, if rescission is the remedy sought, there is no requirement that 
the false speech be material.207 
Finally, some false speech that federally requires materiality to be 
punished does not traditionally require materiality at the state level, or 
vice versa.208 
Consider again the recent SVA controversy.  The SVA penalized anyone
who “falsely represent[ed] himself or herself” regarding award of military
honors.209  Per Wells, the term false representation is a magic buzzword
meaning that the Court must interpret—and Congress ostensibly
intended—a federal criminal statute to have a materiality requirement.210 
Yet Alvarez in the Ninth Circuit did not give weight to the issue of 
materiality.211  Even if it had—or if the Supreme Court other than Justice
Breyer had chosen to do so, which it did not—ahead would lie great 
legal perils in dealing with a materiality standard for the SVA. 
Let us assume, for instance, another court chose to apply its fraud
standard of materiality to a statute such as the SVA.  If Strandlof spoke
in Houston, a Texas state court would have to inquire whether Strandlof
himself believed his false statements were material.  If instead Strandlof
spoke in Lawrence, a Kansas state court would inquire whether a 
reasonable person could believe the false speech to be material.  The 
difference is inexplicable. 
Even if one could settle upon a constitutionally acceptable objective or
subjective test of materiality for Strandlof’s speech, choosing the— 
unsettled—definition of materiality would present difficulties. Under
the de minimus definition of materiality, the government arguably would 
206. See Ryan v. Wersi Elec. GmbH & Co., 59 F.3d 52, 53 (7th Cir. 1995); Top of
Iowa Co-op. v. Schewe, 149 F. Supp. 2d 709, 724 (N.D. Iowa 2001), aff’d, 324 F.3d 627
(8th Cir. 2003). 
207. See Sherwin, supra note 190, passim. 
208. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2012) (requiring materiality in the context of
telling falsehoods under oath in judicial proceedings), with Bell v. Waterfront Comm’n
of N.Y. Harbor, 228 N.E.2d 758, 761–62 (N.Y. 1967) (“[D]eliberately telling a
falsehood under oath or practicing deceit in dealing with a government agency is a 
sufficient predicate for criminal prosecution, adverse regulatory action or administrative
discipline even if the misrepresentation was not ‘material’ . . . .”).
209.  18 U.S.C. § 704(b) (2012). 
210. See United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 494 (1997).  Note that under the 
logic of existing precedent, which tolerates differing state and federal materiality
requirements, were a state to pass an identical version of the SVA, it might not be required to
adhere to the Wells test of materiality. See supra note 208. 
211. By Wells’s logic, dissenting Judge Bybee ostensibly had to show Alvarez’s 
false speech to be material to convict him.  He declined to do so.  See United States v.
Alvarez, 617 F.3d 1198, 1230 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (Bybee, J., dissenting), aff’d, 132 S. 
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fail to carry its burden in demonstrating that Strandlof’s misrepresentations 
caused significant, legally cognizable harm to others—no money was 
lost or stolen, no personal reputations were alleged to be damaged, and if
anything, veterans in Colorado were given more attention, meaning that 
military “honor” was arguably improved through Strandlof’s efforts.  If,
instead, the Kungys v. United States212 definition of materiality applies— 
that Strandlof’s speech influenced another’s decisionmaking—the
government would presumably fare better.
In conclusion, although Justice Breyer mused in Alvarez that a narrowed 
version of the SVA delimited by a materiality requirement should be 
preferred, closer legal analysis of materiality as a candidate for a 
delimiter of false speech sanction makes it clear that it would be unlikely
to succeed in providing prospective speakers with a clearer picture of
First Amendment protections. 
B. Concluding Comments on Sanctions
For purposes of this Article, an examination of other potential false
speech delimiters is unnecessary.  It suffices to say that careful examination
would likely demonstrate that widespread disagreement—similar to that 
seen for falsity and materiality—exists in their application, too. The
confusion surrounding First Amendment delimiters for false speech
sanction is therefore not limited to falsity and materiality or to the 
burden of proof standard that the Ninth Circuit in Alvarez keyed upon.
Rather, judicial irresolution of these three delimiters is merely
exemplary of a far greater First Amendment quagmire. 
Because delimiters for sanctionable false speech are being ignored or
applied in arbitrary, ad hoc, and conflicting ways, we can predict two
problematic consequences.  First, many particular instances of speech— 
even speech that could be plausibly gauged as truthful—have the
potential to be punished.  Second and worse, because courts’ disagreements 
about delimiters make them incapable of restraining sanction of false
speech, legislatures and prosecutors—anticipating a probability of
successful prosecution—might be tempted to enact and enforce near 
perfectly standardless laws penalizing “false”—whatever that means— 
speech concerning any topic of particular legislative interest.  The SVA,
which employed no delimiters other than falsity, is case-in-point, as the























   
    
  
   
plurality and concurrence of Justices in Alvarez sensed.213  The upshot is
that a would-be speaker cannot effectively predict whether the speaker’s
proposed speech is constitutionally protected.214  Much speech is
chilled, notwithstanding judges’ proud but wrong beliefs that they have
vigilantly mounted defenses of the First Amendment. 
VI. EPILOGUE: WE THE PEOPLE’S ROAD TO FIRST 
AMENDMENT SERFDOM
This Article began by presenting conflicts and difficulties in correctly
associating allegedly false speeches with questions of fact—propositions.
As for propositions and their respective truth-values, in postmodern
America, there are vicious clashes about truth—what structure it takes, 
whether it can be coherently articulated, whether truth-values exist, whether 
there can be multiple coexisting truth-values for the same proposition, 
whether truth-values are knowable, whether they are known, whether 
there is a correct method for knowing them, and whether there are multiple 
competing methods that can all be, if not harmonized, simultaneously
tolerated. Moreover, there is debate about whether truth changes, one 
implication being that a speech arguably false at the time it is made
could become true before trial, or vice versa. Finally, this Article also
sought to show that the same patterns of disagreement probably arise not 
just with respect to falsity but with respect to all delimiters that inform 
us about the possibility of punishment for a false speech.
Jurists have their work cut out for them. Differing inclinations for
how to resolve each of these and other potential conceptual points of 
departure prompt unique, often mutually exclusive, resolutions for any
particular false speech allegation.  All of these considerations bring us to 
the final two-part question:
213. For instance, the Ninth Circuit Alvarez majority identified an implicit scienter 
requirement of actual malice in the SVA. See id. at 1209 (majority opinion).  The 
dissent, however, chose not to do so. See id. at 1233 n.12 (Bybee, J., dissenting).  As if
the standardless anarchy of false speech law were not already taxing enough on would-
be speakers, Supreme Court precedent indicates that speakers whose statements are 
judged false cannot plead ignorance of federal laws or jurisdiction as a defense.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63, 74–75 (1984).  The currently standardless, 
yet enforceable state of false speech law is reminiscent of the plight of imperial Rome’s 
subjects, bound by edicts placed on high posts that no one could read. 
214. Predictable law is vital in preserving the Rule of Law and the constitutionally
enshrined freedom of speech. See generally F. A. HAYEK, The Road to Serfdom, in 2 
THE COLLECTED WORKS OF F. A. HAYEK 112 (Bruce Caldwell ed., Definitive ed. 2007) 
(describing the importance of predictable law standards); Guzelian, supra note 44 (elaborating
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Who is the rightful arbiter of false speech cases, and what is the 
arbiter’s proper role in adjudicating false speech cases?
These questions cannot be avoided in addressing false speech. The 
arbiter’s worldview, and the arbiter’s tolerance of a worldview besides
the arbiter’s own, will dictate the outcome of false speech cases.
A. We the People: Machiavellian or Skeptical Lords 
and Pitiful Vassals 
Congress, state legislatures, and municipal councils enact Stolen Valor
Acts and other false speech laws.  Presidents, governors, and mayors 
enforce them.  But in America at the end of the day, courts get the final
call. Marbury v. Madison ensured this.215  One could argue that judges
are not the proper articulators of constitutional law because Marbury was 
wrongly decided.  Some at the fringe do this.216  But even if occasionally 
begrudged, judges are the de facto arbiters of false speech law.
This, however, does not settle the matter.  From where does American
judges’ empowerment to articulate standards for false speech law come?
“Why,” says the puzzled constitutional law scholar, “from the U.S.
Constitution, of course!”  Indeed. Sanctioning false speech is a 
constitutional issue.217  Federal judges have authority to hear cases
arising under the First Amendment.218  State judges are bound to comply
with the First Amendment in deciding state cases.219 The Constitution 
establishes a procedure for the President by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate to select individuals as federal judges;220 state
constitutions establish procedures for selecting individuals as state judges, 
but those procedures must themselves comply with the Constitution.221 
215. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 178–80 (1803). 
216. See Matt DeLong, Gingrich: Send U.S. Marshals To Compel ‘Radical’ Judges
To Explain Rulings, WASH. POST (Dec. 19, 2011, 1:55 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/blogs/post-politics/post/gingrich-send-us-marshals-to-arrest-uncooperative-judges/201 
1/12/18/gIQAlYUg2O _blog.html.  
217. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.  Lawful power to enact Amendment I is also given
in the Constitution.  U.S. CONST. art. V.
 218. See id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
219. See id. art. VI, cl. 2. 
220. See id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 






   












   
 
 
    
   




    
  
The late, great Yale law professor Arthur Leff suggested that the
Constitution has effectively served as a sort of Codex-god—a ruler whose 
authority is just because the ruler exists.222  “We the People” created a
disembodied Codex-god during 1788–1789 and ever since have assented
to the Codex’s subsequent and ongoing control over their affairs.223 Leff
ascribed the Constitution’s centuries of success to two things: (1) an 
overwhelming number of American individuals have continuously
identified themselves as members of “We the People,” who created the
document and continue to honor it, and (2) the Constitution established 
responsibilities, procedures of governance, and individual rights to 
simultaneously establish individual and collective freedoms and just rule.224 
But Leff offered two wicked curveballs on the heels of his praise of
the Constitution.  First he posed the question whether “We the People” 
will continue to be satisfied with their created god.225  Second and relatedly,
Leff pointed out that the Constitution is not and could never be a complete 
moral code.226 
Grave implications follow.  If the Constitution is the creation of men, 
then it is at some level “arbitrary” in its selection or enumeration of 
rights, procedures, and responsibilities.  The Codex-god’s decrees could 
have been otherwise.  Just as Henry Ford did not have to create cars based 
upon petroleum combustion, so too did a founding Constitution not
require a three-branch system of federal government.227  True, the  
Codex-god offers a mechanism to later generations of “We the People” 
to deal with future dissatisfaction about its decrees—the people may
amend it.  But what happens when some members of “We the People”
start to feel like they no longer want to tinker at the margins with the 
Constitution’s sentiments but rather want a total makeover? 
The point perhaps becomes more clear through a technological 
analogy: What if instead of living in the landscape inspired by Henry 
Ford’s twentieth century internal combustion engine substantial numbers of
“We the People” begin to want hydrogen-powered floating automated 
222. Arthur Allen Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 
1247 (“As long as the Constitution is accepted, or at least not overthrown, it successfully
functions as a God would in a valid ethical system: its restrictions and accommodations
govern.  They could be other than they are, but they are what they are, and that is that.”). 
223. See generally PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE 
CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788 (2011) (discussing how “We the People” decided to establish 
the United States Constitution).
224. See Leff, supra note 222, at 1245–49. 
225.  See id. at 1245–46.  
226. See id. at 1245. 
227. See RAY BATCHELOR, HENRY FORD: MASS PRODUCTION, MODERNISM AND 
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vehicle fleets with vast reduction in urban sprawl and pollution?  What if 
others want to stay true to Henry Ford’s original vision, complete with
leaded gasoline? What if still others—Ford-hating Luddites—want
everyone just to walk?  In such circumstances, loyalty to the original 
bulwarks of the Codex-god’s ideals crumbles, as various factions amongst 
“We the People” compete to replace the smoldering ashes of a once 
accepted codex with their particular view of law.228  Similarly, Leff muses,
where the Constitution is textually silent about a right or responsibility,
“interpretations” of the Codex-god’s decrees abound.229 
This appears to be happening in America.  There is increasing divergence
in understandings and beliefs about the Constitution and its applications. 
Some want an apparently preservative originalist interpretation—fidelity
to what they perceive the original “We the People” and the Founding
Fathers intended230—although some contend this practice is in actuality 
post-hoc, ends-directed revisionism.231  Others want a pragmatic living
interpretation not necessarily bound to traditional or historical meaning;232 
228. Antonin Scalia, Economic Affairs as Human Affairs, 4 CATO J. 703, 708
(1985) (“A guarantee may appear in the words of the Constitution, but when the society
ceases to possess an abiding belief in it, it has no living effect.”).
229. See Leff, supra note 222, at 1247. 
230. See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 94, at 38; Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for
Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 622 (1999); Saikrishna Prakash, Radicals in
Tweed Jackets: Why Extreme Left-Wing Professors Are Wrong for America, 106 COLUM. 
L. REV. 2207, 2210 (2006) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN ROBES: WHY 
EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA (2005)); Antonin Scalia, 
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 851–52 (1989); see also William H.
Rehnquist, In Memoriam, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
401, 407 (2006) (criticizing the concept of a “living constitution” unrooted in tradition and
historical meaning).
231. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 230, at 6–9 (contending that “originalist” 
conservative judges are actually as activist and ends-directed as liberal judges).
232. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 234, 253 (1995) (“[T]he 
decision to read the Constitution narrowly, and thereby to ‘restrain’ judicial interpretation, is
not a decision that can be read directly from the text.  The Constitution does not say, 
‘Read me broadly,’ or, ‘Read me narrowly.’ . . . The originalist faces backwards but steals 
frequent sideways glances at consequences.  The pragmatist places the consequences of his
decisions in the foreground.  The pragmatist judge does not deny that his role in interpreting 
the Constitution is interpretive.  He is not a lawless judge.  He does not, in order to do 
short-sighted justice between the parties, violate the Constitution and his oath, for he is
mindful of the systemic consequences of judicial lawlessness.”); see also Erwin Chemerinsky,
History, Tradition, the Supreme Court, and the First Amendment, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 901, 
912 (1993) (arguing that although history is not irrelevant, constitutional protections 

















    
 
 
    
  
    
 
   
     
  
 
   
 
others endorse “perfectionism”;233 others support majoritarian
interpretation;234 still others advocate a two-step translation process from
originalist textual meaning to modern contextual meaning;235 and some,
apparently fed up with monikers in the recent interpretation wars, have
staked out a new moniker and interpretist philosophy: new textualism.236 
In the multiple approaches to “hearing” the god, we discover the trouble. 
Leff observes that where “We the People” generally stop having faith, 
the Codex-god reigns well, or where the Codex-god cannot or does not
speak, a power vacuum forms and causes a rush among various bands of 
individual citizens who constitute “We the People” to assert competing 
normative beliefs, each contending that the Codex-god supports its view 
to the exclusion of others included in “We the People.”237  When the god 
is mute or dead, vassals fight each other to become lords, each claiming 
they can hear the true god or replace the fallen god better than can 
others.238 
As expectations of the Constitution’s authority crumble, a vicious 
power struggle ensues, says Leff.239  If corrupt portions of “We the People”
work their way into administrative power of the Constitution, even 
greater social degradation is possible, as citizens attempt to grab as much
control as possible of the deposed Codex-god’s kingdom: 
All I can say is this: [absent a Codex-god,] it looks as if we are all we have. 
Given what we know about ourselves and each other, this is an extraordinarily
unappetizing prospect; looking around the world, it appears that if all men are 
brothers, the ruling model is Cain and Abel. . . .  As things now stand, everything is
up for grabs. 
Nevertheless: 
Napalming babies is bad.
Starving the poor is wicked. 
233. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 230, at 245 (describing perfectionists). 
234. See, e.g., ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL
THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006) (arguing that courts should specifically follow
written texts and defer to legislative interpretations when texts are unclear).
235. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165, 
1211–12 (1993).
236. See, e.g., James E. Ryan, Laying Claim to the Constitution: The Promise of 
New Textualism, 97 VA. L. REV. 1523, 1524–25 (2011) (asserting that all philosophies of
interpretation—whether conservative or progressive—ultimately revert to textual inquiry).
237. See Leff, supra note 222, at 1247–48; cf. FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT, THE LAW 51
(Ludwig von Mises Inst. 2007) (1850) (“[Law] will be—as it now is—the battlefield for 
everybody’s dreams and everybody’s covetousness.”). 
238. See BASTIAT, supra note 237, at 6 (arguing that due to special interest
monopolization of legal authority and sanction, law “destroys for [the special interest’s] own
profit, and in different degrees amongst the rest of the community, personal independence by
slavery, liberty by oppression, and property by plunder”). 
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Buying and selling each other is depraved. 
Those who stood up to and died resisting Hitler, Stalin, Amin, and Pol 
Pot—and General Custer too—have earned salvation. 
Those who acquiesced deserve to be damned.
There is in the world such a thing as evil.
[All together now:] Sez who?
God help us.240 
Leff’s lament may seem exaggerated and some such as Dworkin 
disagreed that it is inevitable,241 but there are increasingly louder echoes
of it.242  It is reflected in the legal realist movement that has gripped
many in American jurisprudence since the early 1900s when John
Chipman Gray confidently proclaimed, “To quote again from Bishop 
Hoadly . . . ‘Nay, whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any 
written or spoken laws, it is He who is truly the Law Giver to all intents 
and purposes, and not the Person who first who wrote and spoke
them.’”243  Francis Biddle wrote that Justice Holmes believed that “men
240. Id. at 1249. 
241. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).  Dworkin contended there 
are right answers in nearly all cases without necessary resort to shared metaethical
standards. See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 144 (1985); Ronald Dworkin, On
Gaps in the Law, in CONTROVERSIES ABOUT LAW’S ONTOLOGY 84, 84–90 (Paul Amselek
& Neil MacCormick eds., 1991).  However, Dworkin faced challenges from legal realists,
critical legal studies theorists, and others who contend that law is indeterminate.  See Andrew 
Altman, Legal Realism, Critical Legal Studies, and Dworkin, 15 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 205, 235 
(1986). Furthermore, a problem with Dworkin is that he was ontologically agnostic with
respect to the existence of legal morality, contending only that morality can be known— 
as distinguished from natural law. But to say moral law can be known without first
addressing its existence is to put the cart before the horse. 
242. See Leiter, supra note 76, at 876 (“[T]here is no way for Dworkin’s interpretive
theory of law to accommodate what at times appears to be naked political partisanship.”).
See generally  KAREN L. CARR, THE BANALIZATION OF NIHILISM: TWENTIETH-CENTURY
RESPONSES TO MEANINGLESSNESS (1992) (arguing that the commonplace of nihilistic 
beliefs has led to a social environment where ideas can be imposed forcibly with little
resistance and raw power alone determines moral and intellectual hierarchies); LAWRENCE
LESSIG: REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—AND A PLAN TO STOP IT
(2011) (describing the unethical money politics of Congress); PETER SCHWEIZER, THROW 
THEM ALL OUT (2011) (analyzing the systematic corruption of politicians). 
243. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 120 (1909).
Interestingly, Gray only selectively quoted Bishop Hoadly, who in his work importantly
continued, 
I say, if They have this power lodged with them, then the Kingdom, in which
they rule, is not the Kingdom of Christ, but of Themselves; He doth not rule in 
it, but They: And, whether They happen to agree with him, or to differ from








   
















   
    
 
   
 




   
 
     
 
make their own laws . . . these laws do not flow from some mysterious 
omnipresence in the sky, and . . . judges are not independent mouthpieces of
the infinite.”244  Justice Holmes himself wrote, “The common law is not 
a brooding omnipresence in the sky. . . .”245 
If Leff is right, there are unsettling consequences for false speech law 
under the First Amendment.  Will social questions such as “What is truth?” 
be resolved by Lords of the Flies—whichever power-hungry legal 
“godlets” have politically clawed their way into control of the courts?246 
from Christ, either to guide or correct their Decisions, They are Kings of this 
Kingdom, and not Christ Jesus. 
BENJAMIN HOADLY, THE NATURE OF THE KINGDOM, OR CHURCH, OF CHRIST: A SERMON 
PREACH’D BEFORE THE KING 15 (3d ed. 1717). 
244. FRANCIS BIDDLE, JUSTICE HOLMES, NATURAL LAW, AND THE SUPREME COURT 
49 (1961). 
245.  S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
246. Some openly wonder whether procedural processes enshrined in the federal 
and state constitutions are adequate for picking jurists of the highest intellectual and
moral character for the job. See, e.g., Douglas G. Smith, The Historical and Constitutional 
Contexts of Jury Reform, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 377, 458–62 (1996).  Indeed, notable 
individuals now advocate the elimination of direct election state judge appointments to
avoid judicial corruption and taint.  See, e.g., John Schwartz, Effort Begun To Abolish the 
Election of Judges, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2009, at A12 (detailing efforts by former
Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor and others to eliminate political elections 
of state judges).  The federal process for judgeship selection may be no better.  At least 
one U.S. Supreme Court Justice, in moments of revelatory candor, has formally
acknowledged that federal judges and even Supreme Court members may be in the
positions that they are not by their jurisprudential skill and moral superiority but because 
of their adeptness at forming political connections.  Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 
62, 92–93 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia stated,
Today the [Supreme] Court establishes the constitutional principle that party 
membership is not a permissible factor in the dispensation of government jobs, 
except those jobs for the performance of which party affiliation is an ‘appropriate 
requirement.’ . . .  It is hard to say precisely (or even generally) what that exception 
means, but if there is any category of jobs for whose performance party affiliation
is not an appropriate requirement, it is the job of being a judge, where partisanship
is not only unneeded but positively undesirable.  It is, however, rare that a federal
administration of one party will appoint a judge from another party.  And it has 
always been rare. . . . Thus, the new principle that the Court today announces will 
be enforced by a corps of judges (the Members of this Court included) who 
overwhelmingly owe their office to its violation.
Id. (citations omitted).
Some jurists contend that a solution to this problem of corrupted jurists is that where
the Constitution is silent, legislatures not judges must speak.  See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, 
The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 828 
(1986) (declaring that there is a “principle of acceptance of democratic choice where the 
Constitution is silent”).  However, this does not solve the problem.  First, one may ask on 
what authority this principle should be accepted.  Second, deference to legislatures merely
allows for a different corrupting or corrupted subset of “We the People” than judges to
make legal decisions. See James D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner, Public Choice and the
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Will other judges who aspire to act nobly in such a treacherous
environment—and have survived a politicized appointments process— 
defer out of a personal desire for judicial “tolerance” to the increasingly
strident demands of skeptics who calculatingly litigate against truth in First
Amendment cases?
When the Constitution is in effect deposed, might citizens vie for 
preferred forums with sympathetic Lords, whose philosophies and
interpretations of law most favor the outcome they seek?  Partly driven 
by power-lusting Machiavellians, partly by noble judges’ admirable but 
misguided reluctance to make definitive, binding holdings about truth in
false speech cases, might America be inching gradually toward a nihilist’s
legal paradise where the courts either expressly or unwittingly hold that 
nothing is true, that basically all false speech—save that that is offensive or
inconvenient to the presiding jurist—is tolerated? 
B. Keep the Faith: A Hopeful Conclusion 
This Article has pointed to some of possible scores of junctures where
judges and juries may differ whether a speech is false and punishable.
How different judges view reality, truth, speech, the Constitution, and 
the relationship between all of these can lead to profoundly different
outcomes in false speech First Amendment decisions.  For some of these
differences, reasonable minds may plausibly differ. But for others, as
we have noted, discrepancies in rulings appear mutually exclusive,
unpredictable, or unjust.  Is there a root of all of these points of departure,
particularly the “improper” ones?  Is perhaps, just perhaps, the problem
not the administration of law under the Constitution but the authority
behind the incorporation of the Constitution? 
That is, if the answer to the stuffy question “From whence comes
American judges’ empowerment to articulate standards for false speech
law?” is “The Constitution,” the next question becomes, “From whence 
comes the Constitution’s legitimacy to articulate standards for false 
speech law?,” which is answered, “From the authority of ‘We the
People,’ as stated in the Constitution’s Preamble.”
The conversation usually ends there with a knowing nod. But we
might ask still one more question: “And from whence comes ‘We the
ECONOMICS 3, 19 (James D. Gwartney & Richard E. Wagner eds., 1988) (contending that




   




     
 
     
    
    
      
  
 
   
  
    
   
       
 
   
  
       
 
 
   
  
   
  
People’s’ authority to incorporate a Constitution?” Might perhaps the 
source of the maddening multitude of rulings that jurists render in false 
speech law ultimately lie with the Constitution’s recognition of “We the 
People” as the Constitution’s source of incorporation and inspiration? 
However romantic the lore Americans collectively share of its
creation, the Constitution, reduced to base historical facts, appears to
have been created by a group of self-selecting, landed, highly gentrified 
freemen without divine right—and decidedly not by women or minorities.247 
Legal theorists have long mentioned troubling implications of selectively 
man-made law. As Frédéric Bastiat recognized in 1850 and Arthur Leff 
compellingly restated three decades ago, law that is created by any specific
select group of people incrementally regresses to a structure of rules—and
attendant sanctions—that support, rather than punish, power-grabbing
denizens asserting their own wills upon the rest of the unwilling—and
often unlucky and unhappy—citizenry.248  Bastiat famously claimed 
247. Historian Gary North claims that divine right was specifically omitted from the
Constitution and was a radical, unprecedented break with previous American and European
tradition. See GARY NORTH, CONSPIRACY IN PHILADELPHIA: ORIGINS OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION, at xi (2004); see also CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES passim (1913) (criticizing the gentrified creation of
the Constitution).  North offers an entire volume supporting his reasoning, and I shall not 
repeat it here, nor attempt or wish to defend his reasoning.  Yet no less a man in stature 
than Chief Justice Warren Burger acknowledged in personal correspondence to North that the
single most important operative part of the Constitution conceptually is the expression 
“We the People.”  See  NORTH, supra, at 97; see also Louis Michael Seidman, Op-Ed., 
Let’s Give Up on the Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2012, at A19 (“Constitutional
disobedience may seem radical, but it is as old as the Republic.  In fact, the Constitution
itself was born of constitutional disobedience.  When George Washington and the other
framers went to Philadelphia in 1787, they were instructed to suggest amendments to the 
Articles of Confederation, which would have had to be ratified by the legislatures of all 13
states. Instead, in violation of their mandate, they abandoned the Articles, wrote a new 
Constitution and provided that it would take effect after ratification by only nine states, and by
conventions in those states rather than the state legislatures.”). 
248. Bastiat writes, 
[T]he proper purpose of law is to use the power of its collective force to stop 
this fatal tendency to plunder instead of to work.  All the measures of the law 
should protect property and punish plunder.
But, generally, the law is made by one man or one class of men.  And since law
cannot operate without the sanction and support of a dominating force, this
force must be entrusted to those who make the laws. 
 This fact, combined with the fatal tendency that exists in the heart of man to 
satisfy his wants with the least possible effort, explains the almost universal 
perversion of the law.  Thus it is easy to understand how law, instead of checking
injustice, becomes the invincible weapon of injustice.  It is easy to understand 
why the law is used by the legislator to destroy in varying degrees among the rest 
of the people, their personal independence by slavery, their liberty by oppression, 
and their property by plunder.  This is done for the benefit of the person who makes 
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about such law, “The law perverted! . . . It is impossible to introduce 
into society a greater change and a greater evil than this: the conversion
of the law into an instrument of plunder.”249 
For our purposes, the relevant corollary to Bastiat’s and Leff’s writings is
that in a nation where a self-selecting group of elite men are the creators 
of law, not its humble and delegated administrators, their views alone 
are also the measure of truths relevant to legal decisionmaking.  This
Article’s primary thrust was to demonstrate that jurists’ personal conceptions 
of how to reflect the Founders’ First Amendment truths differ profoundly. 
We are then left, regrettably, with the false speech quagmire described in
this Article.
I close by emphasizing that I am not claiming that forced or coerced 
legal adoption of alternative legal codices, biblical or natural law, et cetera, 
to solve the false speech quagmire is likely to succeed where “We the 
People” fall short.  Instead, if “We the People” are beginning to diverge 
widely in their expectations about the First Amendment and what it 
offers, “We the People” will fall ever increasingly into the morass we
have.  I trust I will not be viewed by my admired colleague Mike Seidman
of Georgetown as disrespectful when I gently chide his recent pessimism 
in a New York Times editorial Let’s Give Up on the Constitution where
he states, “[P]erhaps the dream of a country ruled by ‘We the people’ is 
impossibly utopian.  If so, we have to give up on the claim that we are a 
self-governing people who can settle our disagreements through mature 
and tolerant debate.”250 
I must dissent to Seidman’s dissent.  Thriving existence can be found 
only through a certain kind of optimistic faith. The Justinian Code guided
Rome successfully for a millennium because the citizenry had faith and
hope. If “We the People” take the light yoke upon ourselves to continue 
to have an optimistic faith living in a land of sweet liberty, from sea to
shining sea, perhaps that is what we can indeed continue to realize.
Men naturally rebel against the injustice of which they are victims.  Thus,
when plunder is organized by law for the profit of those who make the law, all the 
plundered classes try somehow to enter—by peaceful or revolutionary means—into 
the making of laws.  According to their degree of enlightenment, these plundered 
classes may propose one of two entirely different purposes when they attempt to
attain political power: Either they may wish to stop lawful plunder, or they may
wish to share in it.
FREDERIC BASTIAT, THE LAW 6–7 (Dean Russell trans., 2d ed. 1998) (1850). 
249. BASTIAT, supra note 248, at 1, 8. 







     
 
  




    







      
Let us be clear on the process: individually and collectively,
Americans must first reacquire faith to overcome the skepticism and
nihilism evidenced in this Article.251  Then, through that faith, we can 
gain the necessary optimistic expectations about law by which we may
become communally and gradually enabled to undo the false speech
quagmire.  Downturned despair must be snuffed out in this free nation. 
If some or many of “We the People” aspire to peer habitually into the 
darkness of untruth and truthiness, as this Article has done in a quasi-
parody—if we are faithful skeptics, if we side with nihilism—that is 
what we will indeed continue to receive. If we unify in a faithful, 
honest, hopeful, and humble search for truth with charitable application,
doubtlessly we will, despite differences, accomplish what we set out to.  We 
might fittingly adapt as an epigraph a President’s encouraging words at a
time surely more troubling than now:
We know how to save the Union.  The world knows we do know how to save 
it. We—even we here—hold the power and bear the responsibility. . . .  We shall 
nobly save or meanly lose the last, best hope of earth. . . .  The way is plain, peaceful,
generous, just—a way which, if followed, the world will forever applaud, and
God must forever bless.252 
Give up on truth?  No. It falls to those of “We the People” who are 
our current or potential judges and juries to find or rediscover their own 
heroic faith before they take on the next false speech case, or perhaps
other questions of law, for that matter. 
251. See Philippians 4:8 (“[W]hatever is true, whatever is honorable, whatever is 
just, whatever is pure, whatever is pleasing, whatever is commendable, if there is any
excellence and if there is anything worthy of praise, think about these things.”); see also
1 Corinthians 15:1–3 (“I would remind you . . . of the good news that I proclaimed to you,
which you in turn received, in which also you stand, through which also you are being
saved . . . . For I handed on to you as of first importance what I in turn had received: that
Christ died for our sins . . . and that he was buried, and that he was raised on the third
day . . . .”). 
252. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, Annual Message to Congress (Dec. 1, 1862), in 2 ABRAHAM 
LINCOLN COMPLETE WORKS 261, 277 (John George Nicolay & John Hay eds., The Century
Co. 1907). 
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